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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI):
The Compatibility with UNCLOS and the 2005 SUA
Convention
– the way forward in the East Asian region –

Degree:

Master of Science in Maritime Affairs
(Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration)

This dissertation examines the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a
multilateral effort that aims to interdict shipments of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) and related materials.

Given its flexibility as an “activity” rather than an

organization, the initiative has gained supports from more than 90 countries since its
interception in 2003.
While the Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP), the operational
principles of the initiative, notes that the PSI activities are consistent with national
legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, as the paper reveals,
the SOP is not compatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982 (UNCLOS).
The dissertation also provides critical reviews of the Protocol of 2005 to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, 1988 in the PSI perspectives.

iv

The new Protocol has broadened the

range of offences to include criminalization of the transportation of WMD.
Moreover, it has introduced boarding provisions which authorize states to board a
foreign flagged vessel on the high seas. These newly introduced provisions will
enhance the legitimacy of the PSI operations, upon entering into force.
Further, the East Asian region, where one of the “proliferation concern
states” is located, is focused.

The response of the states in the region to the PSI is

carefully examined and the analysis leads that the states in the region are not willing
to participate in the PSI, having reservation about the legitimacy of the initiative.
The author concludes with suggestions that establishing a formal
organization; strengthening the legality by introducing a new UN Security Council
resolution; and expanding the outreach activities are the keys for the PSI to be a
full-fledged regime so that it will acquire global support and be able to contribute
towards international peace and security.

KEYWORDS:

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Statement of Interdiction
Principles (SOP), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
UNCLOS, 2005 SUA Convention, the East Asian region
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
On December 9, 2002, two Spanish warships, under the request of the
United States, stopped and boarded a North Korean cargo vessel flying no flag while
it was crossing the Gulf of Aden, about 600miles southeast of the Yemen coast.1
They found 15 scud missiles 2 under bags of cement.

According to U.S.

administration officials, the vessel had been tracked by American intelligence “all the
way out” from North Korea, however, they were not sure whether those missiles
were bound for Yemen, some other nations in that region, or terrorist groups.3

1

Before boarding the So San, two Spanish navy vessels, the Navarra and the Patino fired
warning shots across its bow as it tried to escape from them and, in the end, Spanish special force
troops boarded by helicopter. See Thom Shanker, "Threats and Responses: Arms Smuggling;
Scud Missiles Found on Ship of North Korea," The New York Times, December 11 2002.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A0DE7DF153AF932A25751C1A9649C8B63.
For the details of the So San incident see Ibid.; Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security
Initiative; Making Waves in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2005), 35.; Thomas E. Ricks and Peter
Slevin, "Spain and U.S. Seize N. Korean Missiles: Scuds Were on Ship Bound for Yemen,"
Washington Post, December 11 2002. http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/27c/527.html.; Joby
Warrick, "On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory," Washington Post August 14,
2003. http://www.washingtonpost.com/.
2
The scud missiles (400 miles range) are developed based on a Soviet-era design for a tactical
surface-to-surface missile. Although it does not have high accuracy, if it is equipped with
chemical or biological weapons that do not require high accuracy, the causing effect is
considerable. See Shanker, note 1 above.
According to Spanish Defense Minister, Federico Trillo, after the initial search, American
explosives experts secured the missiles and finally found out that there were 15 complete scud
missiles, with 15 conventional, high-explosive warheads and 23 tanks of nitric acid, and 85
barrels of chemicals. See David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "Threats and Responses: War
Matériel; Reluctant U.S. Gives Assent for Missiles to Go to Yemen," The New York Times,
December 12 2002.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01EFD91738F936A25755C0A9659C8B63&s
ec=&spon=&pagewanted=print.
3
Benjamin Friedman, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The Legal Challenge," in the

1

However, when President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen told the United States that he
had legally bought them for the defense of his country, U.S. officials had to release
the vessel as the White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, stated that “there is no
provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of
missiles from North Korea.”4
The vessel was sailing without a flag and the identification marking was
painted over, it appeared as a “lawless, stateless vessel.”5

Under Article 110 of the

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, warships are
justified to conduct “right of visit” to a vessel on the high seas if there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that “the ship is without nationality.”6

Yemen is a party to

UNCLOS and North Korea is not, however, this provision is applicable to North
Korea as well, since customary international law does apply to it in this case.7
Therefore, the boarding by Spanish Navy can be justified.
However, seizure of the cargo was questioned as neither North Korea nor
Yemen has signed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was
intended to prevent the spread of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).8

Moreover, President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen claimed that he had

legally bought them for the defense of his country. In the end, the trade of scud
Bipartisan Security Group (2003). http://www.gsinstitute.org/gsi/pubs/09_03_psi_brief.pdf.
4
Sanger and Shanker, note 2 above.
5
Shanker, note 1 above.
6
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (hereinafter UNCLOS), Art. 110
for other reasons for a ship to be boarded on the high seas: engaging in piracy, slave trade,
unauthorized broadcasting, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship. Legal issues with respect to UNCLOS will be
discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
7
See Michael Byers, "Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative," The
American Journal of International Law 98, no. 3 (2004). http://proquest.umi.com/.
8
See Sanger and Shanker, note 2 above.
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missiles between North Korea and Yemen was considered as “legal” and Fleischer
had to comment that “While there is authority to stop and search, in this instance
there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of scud missiles from North Korea to
Yemen. And, therefore, the merchant vessel is being released.”9

Even though there

are doubts of the vessel’s nationality, there is no legality to search WMD on board a
vessel, likewise there are no laws prohibiting the transport of conventional arms.10
The So San incident clearly demonstrated that existing regimes did not have
sufficient capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD.

However, a worldwide

trend of counter-terrorism has been seeking some ways to prevent the spread of
WMD and related materials to maintain international peace and security.

It was

especially true for the United States where tragic terrorist attacks were brought about
as realities on September 11, 2001. Moreover, it has been a top priority on the
agenda among the states in East Asia where one of the “proliferation concern states”
is located. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the answer that the United
States and like-minded countries has sought and it was announced in May 2003, in
Krakow, Poland.

The PSI is a multilateral effort that aims to interdict the “transfer

or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states
and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”11
However, the initiative did not receive positive reaction from countries such
as China and Russia in the East Asian region. They expressed reservations about
9

Kevin Drew, "Law Allows Search, but Does Not Address Seizure of Cargo," (2002),
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/11/missiles.legal/index.html.
10
See Valencia, note 1 above.
11
The White House, "Fact Sheet: Proliferation Security Initiative; Statement of Interdiction
Principles," (hereinafter SOP) September 4, 2003,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/print/20030904-11.html.
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legitimacy of the initiative under international law.

Without a global support of the

initiative, the effectiveness of PSI activities will certainly be limited.

While the

United States and like-minded states have been expanding the initiative, two 2005
SUA Protocols were adopted in October 2005.

The Protocols, inter alia, have

broadened the range of offences, and transportation of WMD and its related materials
are criminalized.

Moreover, a boarding provision that will allow states to board a

suspected vessel on the high seas, has been added.

These amendments, upon

entering into force, are greatly expected to enhance PSI activities.
The following analysis aims to examine the controversial legal issues
surrounding the PSI with respect to UNCLOS; critically review the 2005 SUA
Convention and clarify what it implies for the PSI; and carefully review the reactions
of the major countries of the East Asian region.

Through the analysis, this

dissertation clarifies what modifications are needed for the PSI, so that it will be
accepted in the East Asian region and the world.
proceeds in five chapters.

For this aim, the dissertation

In Chapter 2, an overview of the development of the PSI

is provided and analysis of the principles of the initiative clarifies what and whom it
is actually targeting at.

Chapter 3 provides critical analysis of the PSI’s

compatibility with UNCLOS.

The PSI’s legitimacy is analyzed under each

applicable maritime zone with actual interdiction examples.

It further explains

boarding agreements that the United States has been concluding with the major flags
of registry countries. Chapter 4 examines the 2005 SUA Convention in the PSI
perspective.

An overview of the development of the Convention is provided and

two key features of the new Convention in relation to the initiative are particularly

4

reviewed. Further, implication of this new SUA Convention for the PSI is analyzed.
Chapter 5 provides reviews how major countries in the East Asian region responded
to the PSI and it clarifies issues what the countries are concerned about. Finally, in
Chapter 6, this dissertation concludes by providing suggestions hoping that the PSI,
though the current structure is not ideal, will become a full-fledged regime so that it
will be able to contribute toward international peace and security.

5

CHAPTER 2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PSI
2.1. The emergence of the PSI
The release of the So San coincided with the United States’ issuance of the
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction on December 11 which
called for a comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of WMD.

It set three

principal pillars: Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use; Strengthened
Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation; and Consequence Management to
Respond to WMD Use.12

Having set such a National Strategy, it was noteworthy

that the White House had to admit that there was no legal authority to interdict the
found scud missiles.

The So San incident demonstrated the limits of

counter-proliferation policy under conventional international law and, thus, it
hastened the United States to formulate the new initiative with like-minded nations.
On May 31, 2003, five months after the So San incident, President of the
United States, George W. Bush, made a speech to the people of Poland at Wawel
Royal Castle in Krakow, Poland.

In this speech, he showed a basic idea of stopping

proliferation of WMD and announced a new approach to fight the proliferation of
WMD called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

12

The United States, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December
2002 (Washington, DC). http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-wmd.pdf.

6

When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit,
we must have the means and authority to seize them.

So today I

announce a new effort to fight proliferation called the Proliferation
Security Initiative.

The United States and a number of our close allies,

including Poland, have begun working on new agreements to search
planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or
missile technologies.

Over time, we will extend this partnership as

broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive weapons away
from our shores and out of the hands of our common enemies.

13

PSI is a “global effort that aims to stop shipments of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide.” 14
John Bolton, then-U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security, who was tasked to establish new responses to the So San incident, stated at
the testimony before the House International Relations Committee, “Our goal is to
work with other concerned states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation
trade at sea, in the air and on land,” and he continued to say, “Over time, we will
extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive
weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our enemies.”15

13

According

George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President to the People of Poland,"
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030531-3.html.
14
Bureau of Nonproliferation. U.S. Department of State, "The Proliferation Security Initiative,"
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/34726.htm.
15
John R. Bolton, "U.S. Efforts to Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Testimony
before
the
House
International
Relations
Committee,"
(June
4,
2003),
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/21247.htm.
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to Bolton, the PSI’s goal is not only preventing the proliferation of WMD, but also
“to eliminate or roll back such weapons from rogue states and terrorist groups that
already possess them or are close to doing so.”16

We believe that the existing system of national export control systems
[and] multilateral export control agreements were not completely
effective because there’s still a thriving black market in WMD
components, technologies, and production materials. And what we
wanted to do was to find more active ways of dealing with the ongoing
trafficking in all of these WMD-related materials-not to replace the
export control regimes, but to do something that would be more effective
in handling all of this trafficking. And based on what we’ve seen with
the So San interdiction [and] based on a variety of law enforcement and
other operations that had been conducted, we felt there was a potential to
have a multilateral agreement that would allow us to do that-to conduct
interdiction of WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land.17

On June 12, 2003, two weeks after George W. Bush’s announcement of the
PSI to fight the proliferation of WMD, the first meeting of the PSI was held in
Madrid, Spain.18

Participants in the meeting were Australia, France, Germany, Italy,

16

Ibid.
Arms Control Association, "The New Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John
Bolton," November 2003,
http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/2003/November/Bolton.asp.
18
See note above 14.
17

8

Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, which became a “core group” of the PSI. In the first meeting, they agreed to
assess existing national authorities whether they have such practical measures and to
encourage the various export control regimes to incorporate with the PSI to
strengthen those regimes.19
The second meeting was held in Brisbane, Australia on July 9-10, 2003,
where the participants focused on “defining actions necessary to collectively or
individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related items at sea, in the
air or on land.”20

The meeting also emphasized effective information sharing for

interdiction, and agreed to “strengthen and improve capabilities for the exchange of
information and analysis between participants as a basis for cooperative action to
impede WMD and missile trade.”21

Moreover, the meeting agreed to have a series

of interdiction training exercises, utilizing both military and civilian assets as
appropriate.
Most significantly, a third PSI meeting was held on September 3-4, 2003 in
Paris where the core group agreed to the Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP)
which identifies the “concrete actions to collectively or individually interdict
shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials”22 and is, thus,
19

Bureau of Nonproliferation. U.S. Department of State, "Proliferation Security Initiative:
Chairman's Statement at the First Meeting of the PSI," June 12, 2003, Madrid, Spain,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/25382.htm.
20
Bureau of Nonproliferation. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Statement at the
Second Meeting of the PSI, July 9-10, 2003 " Brisbane, Australia, July 10, 2003,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/25377.htm.
21
Ibid.
22
Bureau of Nonproliferation. "Proliferation Security Initiative: Chairman's Statement at the
Third Meeting of the PSI, September 3-4, 2003," Paris, France, September 4, 2003,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/25425.htm.
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considered as the principle of PSI activities. Moreover, the participants affirmed
that the PSI is consistent with the United Nations (UN) Security Council Presidential
statement of 31 January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD
threatens international peace and security, and emphasizes the need to prevent
proliferation.

Moreover, they agreed that the PSI would be a good tool to

implement it.23

2.2. The Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP)
The SOP (See Appendix A for the full text of SOP) identifies specific steps
for the effective interdiction of WMD, and was developed and published by the core
group of the PSI on September 4, 2003: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
In the preamble of the four principles, it states;

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to
establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to
impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related
materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant
international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.24

This is an important paragraph as it states all the principles of the PSI and
23
24

Ibid.
SOP (See note 11 above.)

10

that the participants activities are based on national legal authorities, relevant
international law, and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. The SOP is
not establishing any new legal frameworks, rather it is a guideline which
participating states are recommended to follow for the interdiction of WMD.
Paragraph 1 of the Principles states the PSI participants commit themselves
to undertake effective measures for “interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD,
their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors
of proliferation concern.”25

Although it is not defining what “States or non-state

actors of proliferation concern” are, it is generally referring to certain states or
entities that are engaged in proliferation of WMD. (The issue surrounding “States or
non-state actors of proliferation concern” will be further discussed in section 2.2.1
below.)
Paragraph 2 encourages PSI participants to adopt “streamlined procedures”
for rapid information sharing concerning suspected proliferation activities. 26
Moreover, participants are encouraged to dedicate appropriate resources and efforts
to interdiction operations to maximize coordination of it.27

In paragraph 3, PSI

participants commit themselves to review their relevant national legal authorities and
international law and frameworks to strengthen them if it is necessary.28
Paragraph 4 provides specific actions to support the interdiction efforts of
PSI participants.29

25
26
27
28
29

This paragraph is important to note for the following discussion

Ibid., paragraph 1.
Ibid., paragraph 2.
Ibid.
Ibid., paragraph 3.
Ibid., paragraph 4.
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in this paper that all the specific actions indicated in this paragraph should be taken
“to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their
obligations under international law and frameworks.”30
Paragraph 4-a asks PSI participants “Not to transport or assist in the
transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation
concern” and it also requests them “not to allow any persons subject to their
jurisdiction to do so.” 31

This sub-paragraph shows that PSI includes the

transportation of WMD both “to” and “from” the states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern.
In paragraph 4-b, PSI participants, at their own initiative or at the request
and good cause shown by another state, should “take action to board and search any
vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the
territorial sea of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize
such cargoes that are identified.”32

This sub-paragraph reflects the present status of

flag state jurisdiction under UNCLOS that if a vessel which is flying its flag of
nationality is “reasonably” suspected, the flag state is expected to board and search
the vessel for the interdiction of WMD.
Paragraph 4-c envisions the case when flag states can not exercise their
jurisdiction.

Under those situations, PSI participants are encouraged to “seriously

consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and

30
31
32

Ibid.
Ibid., paragraph 4-a.
Ibid., paragraph 4-b.

12

searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such
WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.”33

As it

is anticipated that those transportations are conducted where a flag state authority can
not reach in time, this paragraph encourages flag state to allow other PSI participants
who can reach the place in time to board and search the vessels on their behalf.
(Boarding agreement will be further discussed in section 3.7.)
Paragraph 4-d commits PSI participants to take appropriate actions to “(1)
stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, of contiguous zones (when
declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are
identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports,
internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and
seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.” 34

Although the actions taken under

paragraphs 4-b and 4-c are based on flag state jurisdiction, the actions stated in this
paragraph are under coastal state jurisdiction.
Paragraph 4-e considers the case conducted by aircraft.

PSI participants, at

their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state,
should take actions to “(a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying
such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are
transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are
identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes
33
34

Ibid., paragraph 4-c.
Ibid., paragraph 4-d.
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transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.”35
Although it has been dealing with the transportation of WMD up to the
previous paragraph, paragraph 4-f deals with the transshipment points for those
cargos.

“If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points

for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation
concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected
of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.”36
As has been seen, the SOP is not establishing any new legal frameworks and
the PSI is not a separate approach to counter proliferation, rather it is an operational
mechanism which PSI participants are recommended to follow under the existing
national legal authority and relevant international law and frameworks to constrain
the flow of WMD.

2.2.1. “States and non-state actors of proliferation concern”
In the preamble of the SOP, it states, “PSI participants are committed to the
following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis
through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related
materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”37
As briefly touched upon in the previous section, when “states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern” is mentioned in the SOP, it is not clear what states fall under
that category.

35
36
37

In paragraph 1 of the SOP, it states;

Ibid., paragraph 4-e.
Ibid., paragraph 4-f.
Ibid., preamble.
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“States or non-state actors of proliferation concern” generally refers to
those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish
should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in
proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2)
transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their
delivery systems, or related materials.38 (Italics added for emphasis)

In the second PSI meeting held in July 9-10, 2003 in Brisbane, Australia, the
Chairman’s Statement notes that “states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern” referred to North Korea and Iran.39 Bolton also explains, “North Korea,
Iran, and Syria, among others, are clearly states of proliferation concern.”40 However,
at the same time, he states that the PSI efforts are not directed at any one country, but,
instead, at would-be proliferators to halt the worldwide trafficking in WMD, delivery
systems, and related materials.41
India, Israel, and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons and have stayed outside
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 and
38

Ibid., paragraph 1.
See Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 20 above.
40
John R. Bolton, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Vision Becomes Reality: Remarks to
the First Anniversary Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative," Krakow, Poland, May 31,
2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33046.htm.; Bolton, "Stopping the Spread of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative,"
Tokyo, Japan, October 27, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37480.htm.
41
Bolton, "Stopping the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asian-Pacific
Region”(See note 40 above.); Bolton, "Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction
Principles, Remarks at Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting," Paris, France, September 4,
2003, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm.
39
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prevents all of its states-parties except China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States from owning nuclear weapons.42

In the interview held in

November 2003, Bolton responded to a question about the shipments of
WMD-related goods to India, Israel, and Pakistan;

There are unquestionably states that are not within existing treaty
regimes that possess weapons of mass destruction legitimately. We’re
not trying to have a policy that attempts to cover each and every one of
those circumstances. What we’re worried about are the rogue states and
the terrorist groups that pose the most immediate threat.”43

It can be said that the emphasis of the PSI is on “bad actors” rather than “bad
weapons.”44
Although it might receive criticisms, saying that the term “states and
non-state actors of proliferation concern” is not clear, on the other hand, there is also
a positive notion that the term provides flexibility and allows PSI participants to
decide at the time of interdiction depending on the situation.
42

For example, some

See Wade Boese, "Proliferation Security Initiative: A Piece of the Arms Control Puzzle,"
Georgetown
Journal
of
International
Affairs
2005,
63.
http://www.armscontrol.org/aca/midmonth/2003/November/Bolton.asp.
43
Arms Control Association, note 17 above.
44
Boese, note 42 above, at 63. See also Mark J Valencia, "Unsettling Asia for Security's Sake,"
Far Eastern Economic Review 168, no. 3 (2005), 57. http://proquest.umi.com/. On the contrary,
Dhanapala, then-Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, stated
that “[t]hey are not dangerous simply when located inside so-called ‘rogue states.’ They are
dangerous everywhere and always,” and he emphasized the importance of multilateral treaty
regime such as BWC, CWC, and NPT. See Jayantha Dhanapala, "Multilateral Approaches to
WMD Threats after September 11," Speech given at Annual Luncheon of the Arms Control
Association, Washington, D.C., January 22, 2002,
http://disarmament.un.org/speech/22jan2002.htm
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years ago, Libya would probably be one of the actors of “proliferation concern”,
however, it may not be considered to poses an “immediate threat” to the world today
since Libya decided to abandon WMD programs following the BBC China
incident.45 (BBC China incident will be discussed in Chapter 3)

2.2.2. What are Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)?
In the SOP and other official statements regarding the PSI, Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) is a term used interchangeably with nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons, and is not defined.

It does not, even, refer to any specific

international conventions governing the possession of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and the spread of missile technology.46

The U.S. Code provides

the definition of WMD under Section 2303, Chapter 40: Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Title 50: War and National Defense;

The term “weapon of mass destruction” means any weapon or device
that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a significant number of people through the release,
dissemination, or impact of –
(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors;
(B) a disease organism; or
45

See Andrew C. Winner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction,"
The
Washington
Quarterly
28,
no.
2
(2005):
133-38.
http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_winner.pdf.
46
See Jofi Joseph, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Can Interdiction Stop Proliferation?,"
Arms
Control
Today
34,
no.
5
(2004):
8.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_06/Joseph.asp?print.
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(C) radiation or radioactivity.47

However, this definition does not apply to the SOP, and when the term
WMD is used in the SOP or official statement of the PSI activity, it can be
considered to refer to the general terms of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
There are also critics that indicate a lack of definition of the term “related
materials,”48 saying that “while WMD and delivery systems can be defined in
general terms, the same does not apply for ‘related materials’,”49 because more
precise control is required for dual-use (civilian/military) materials to prohibit
individuals from transporting them.

By not providing a definition, PSI participants

may maintain flexibility of the shipment of dual-use materials that are applicable, for
example, to both chemical weapons and civilian use depending on their final
destination.50

The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), adopted April 28,

2004, gives a definition for “related materials” although this applies only for this
resolution, not for the SOP or other official statement of the PSI activity:

Materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral
treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which
could be used for the design development, production or use of nuclear,
47

The U.S. Code. Section 2303: Definition; Chapter 40: Defense against Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Title 50: War and National Defense.
48
See Joseph, note 46 above.; Christer Ahlström, "PSI International Law Aspects of the
Statement of Interdiction Principles," in SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and
International Security, ed. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 758. http://yearbook2005.sipri.org/ch18/ch18.
49
Ahlström, note 48 above, at 759.
50
Joseph, note 46 above, at 9.
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chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.51

2.3. UN Security Council Resolution 1540
The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted on April 28, 2004 at
its 4956th meeting. The Resolution calls upon all States,

in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and
consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent
illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means
of delivery, and related materials.52 (Italics added for emphasis)

It requests states to develop effective measures, rules, and regulations to prevent the
proliferation of WMD.

The United States considers that the PSI and the SOP

identify the steps that can produce the kind of cooperation which is called for in UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 and, therefore, the Resolution and the PSI activity
are considered as “mutually reinforcing and are legally and political compatible.”53
The Chairman’s Statement at the 1st Anniversary PSI meeting held on May 31-June1,
2004 also notes that the PSI is consistent with UN Security Council Resolution
1540.54

This resolution was proposed by the United States, as in President Bush’s

51

United
Nations
Security
Council
Resolution
S/RES/1540
(2004).
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement
52
Ibid.
53
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Nonproliferation, "Fact Sheet: Proliferation Security
Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)," Washington, DC, May 26, 2005,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/46839.htm.
54
Bureau of Nonproliferation. U.S. Department of State, "Chairman's Statement at the 1st
Anniversary PSI Meeting, May 31-June1, 2004 " Krakow, Poland, June 1, 2004,

19

address to the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2003, to criminalize the
proliferation of weapons.

Because proliferators will use any route or channel that is open to them,
we need the broadest possible cooperation to stop them.

Today, I ask

the U.N. Security Council to adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution.
This resolution should call on all members of the U.N. to criminalize the
proliferation of weapons -- weapons of mass destruction, to enact strict
export controls consistent with international standards, and to secure any
and all sensitive materials within their own borders.55 (Italics added for
emphasis)

However, the set Resolution does not contain any phrases that criminalize
the proliferation of WMD.

Moreover, in a draft resolution, it contained the explicit

word “interdict,” however, the phrase “take cooperative action to prevent illicit
trafficking” was introduced in its place from March 24, 2004 after China’s objections,
the last of the five permanent members of the Security Council to agree to the draft
resolution.56

Nevertheless, this resolution can be a supportive mechanism for states

to develop effective measures, rules, and regulations to prevent the proliferation of

http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/33208.htm.
55
United Nations, "Statement by His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush, President of the United
States of America: Address to the United Nations General Assembly," September 23, 2003,
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/usaeng030923.htm.
56
See Merav Datan, "Security Council Resolution 1540: WMD and Non-State Trafficking,"
Disarmament
Diplomacy
April/May
2005,
no.
79
(2005).
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd79/79md.htm/.
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WMD as well as operating the PSI activities.

2.4. Participation in the PSI
According to the U.S. Department of State, as of May 22, 2008, 91 countries
are participating in the PSI.57 (See Appendix B for the list of PSI participants) The
Chairman’s Statement at the Fifth Meeting held on March 4-5, 2004 in Lisbon,
Portugal, provides practical steps that can establish the basis for involvement in PSI
activities as following:

- Formally commit to and publicly endorse the PSI and its Statement of
Interdiction Principles and indicate willingness to take all steps
available to support PSI efforts.
- Undertake a review and provide information on current national legal
authorities to undertake interdictions at sea, in the air or on land.
Indicate willingness to strengthen authorities where appropriate.
- Identify specific national assets that might contribute to PSI efforts
(e.g. information sharing, military and/or law enforcement assets).
- Provide points of contact for PSI interdiction requests and other
operational activities. Establish appropriate internal government
processes to coordinate PSI response efforts.
- Be willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises
and actual operations as opportunities arise.
57

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State,
“Proliferation Security Initiative Participants,” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm/.
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- Be willing to consider signing relevant agreements (e.g. boarding
agreements) or to otherwise establish a concrete basis for cooperation
with PSI efforts (e.g. MOU on overflight denial).58 (Italics added for
emphasis)

Although many of the steps stated in the above contain the word “willing”
as indicated in italics, it is not clear how states show their “willingness.”

States

have not adopted any legally binding documents or drafted a charter to define its
scope and mandate, but only follow the SOP. 59

Based on the SOP, the PSI

participants are expected to share intelligence, enhance the cooperation of military
and law enforcement agencies on a global basis to interdict trafficking in WMD,
delivery systems, and related materials60, however, there is no obligation.

The

nature of the PSI is, thus, often described as “an activity, not an organization.” John
Bolton, then-U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,
stated at the Press Conference at the 1st anniversary meeting of the PSI held on June
1, 2004 in Krakow, Poland:

…it’s an activity, not an organization. It has no Director General, it has
no Headquarters, it has no Secretariat, it has no budget.

58

It’s a question

Bureau of Nonproliferation. U.S. Department of State, "Proliferation Security Initiative:
Chairman's Statement at the Fifth Meeting of the PSI, March 4-5, 2004," Lisbon, Portugal, March
5, 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/30960.htm.
59
See Joseph, note 46 above, at 8.
60
John R. Bolton, "International Security Issues, Arms Control Matters, and Nonproliferation:
Press Conference at U.S. Embassy Beijing," Beijing, China, February 16, 2004,
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/29723.htm.
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of the participating nations cooperating in a variety of ways when the
occasion arises.

If you say it’s an activity, not an organization long

enough all kinds of things become clear.61

This notion that the PSI is “an activity, not an organization” might give
advantages for states to participate in the meetings or exercises as observers who
want to keep a certain distance from the PSI coalition.

However, there are

disadvantages that no states can check the participants’ seriousness and commitments
and, moreover, the PSI’s sustainability can be questioned.62

2.5. Operational expert meetings and exercises
The main activity of the PSI is its operational exercises that involve military
and law enforcement agencies.

Just one week after the announcement of the SOP,

the first interdiction exercise, called “PACIFIC PROTECTOR” was conducted in the
Coral Sea of Australia on September 10-13, 2003.
France, Japan, and the United States participating.63

It was hosted by Australia, with
As of August 2008, more than

30 exercises had been conducted at sea, in the air, and on land, and more than 20
operational expert meetings had been held.64 (This means more than 6 exercises and
4 operational expert meetings per year on average since the announcement of the

61

Bolton, "Press Conference on the Proliferation Security Initiative," Krakow, Poland, May 31,
2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33556.htm.
62
See Mary Beth Nikitin, "CRS Report for Congress: Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) "
February 4, 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34327.pdf.
63
Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 14 above. See also Australian Government Department of
Defence, "Proliferation Security Initiative," http://www.defence.gov.au/PSI/default.htm.
64
Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 14 above.
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SOP.

See Appendix C for the Proliferation Security Initiative Meetings and

Exercises.)

Those exercises are discussed and planned through the operational

experts meetings.

It can be said that there are two purposes for the exercises: to

build the participants capabilities for cooperation and to show their activities in the
public for discouraging would-be proliferators from their action.65

65

See Arms Control Association, "The Proliferation Security Initiative at a Glance," June 2004,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI.asp.; Boese, note 42 above, at 62-63. There is an
opinion that providing “evidence to the public of a genuine political commitment” is also one of
the purposes of the exercises. See Winner, note 45 above, at 134.
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CHAPTER 3. COMPATIBILITY WITH UNCLOS
The PSI participants are encouraged to commit the SOP to prevent the
shipment of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, “consistent with national legal
authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.”66

The PSI does not

provide any new legal power to the PSI participants, however, every PSI activity
must be conducted under the existing national and international laws and regimes.
Nevertheless, the compatibility between the PSI and UNCLOS has been a
controversial issue since its establishment.
In this Chapter, the compatibility of the PSI with UNCLOS will be
examined with actual interdiction examples under each applicable maritime zone:
internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, straits used for international
navigations, archipelagic seas, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the high seas.
Through this process, this paper will clarify problematic issues within the SOP when
practiced alongside UNCLOS. Then, it will also discuss why the United States is
rushing to make boarding agreements with the major flags of registry countries such
as Panama and Liberia despite criticism from scholars as described below.

3.1. Internal Waters
66

SOP (See note 11 above.)
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In internal waters, the coastal state enjoys its full territorial sovereignty67 and,
therefore, the right of innocent passage which exists in the territorial sea does not
apply.68

Thus, as long as a suspected vessel stays in the port of the coastal state, the

coastal state is free to board, search, and seize its cargoes if the cargoes are against
the domestic laws.
lawsuit.69

If the cargo is seized, it usually becomes a matter of a civil

The coastal states sovereignty provides legality for the PSI activities

stated in Paragraph 4(f) of the SOP that require coastal states “to inspect vessels,
aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes,
and to seize such cargoes that are identified” in their ports, airfields, or other
facilities.70

3.1.1. The Ku Wol San incident
On June 25, 1999, the North Korean vessel Ku Wol San was suspected of
transporting spare parts that are used for making missiles and atomic reactors to
Pakistan, and was detained at Kandla port in Gujarat, India.71

The Indian port

authority searched the vessel and, while doing so, the crew turned violent with the
result that all 44 crew members were arrested.72

67

Indian officials found the vessel

UNCLOS, Article 2.
R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1999), 61.
69
Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis, "Sailing into Uncharted Waters?: The Proliferation Security
Initiative and the Law of the Sea," in BASIC Research Report (BRITISH AMERICAN
SECURITY
INFORMATION
COUNCIL,
2004),
46.
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/04PSI.htm.
70
SOP, paragraph 4(f).
71
See Yann-Huei Song, "The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality,
Implementation, and an Assessment," Ocean Development & International Law 38 (2007):
119-20.; Persbo and Davis, note 69 above, at 47.; Warrick, note 1 above.
72
See Persbo and Davis, note 69 above, at 47.
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was carrying components, testing equipment, and blue prints for the manufacture of
Scud-type missiles, and had a falsely made cargo manifest.
Carrying military cargo to a third country, in this case to Pakistan, does not
constitute any offence under Customs law of India if there is a proper declaration for
the shipment, however, the faulty cargo manifest was a criminal offence. 73
Therefore, the Indian authority’s action was compatible with the Article 2 of
UNCLOS; the coastal states have full sovereignty in internal waters. The search
conducted at an Indian port against a foreign flagged vessel, North Korea, without
consent of the flag state was legal. The vessel was released three months later, in
September, and the Indian authority explained that no charges would be imposed but
provided no explanation as to why not.74

3.1.2. The BBC China incident
In late September 2003, the United States and U.K. intelligence services
found that the BBC China, a German flagged vessel owned by a German company,
was carrying thousands of centrifuge parts, equipment to enrich uranium, and en
route to Libya.75

They informed the German government and accordingly, in early

October, the German authorities contacted the shipowner. The shipowner was asked
73

Persbo and Davis, note 69 above, at 48.
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75
See Barry Schweid, "U.S. Nabbed Libya Nuke Parts," CBS NEWS (January 1, 2004),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/01/14/world/printable593139.shtml.; James Martin Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, "Proliferation Security Initiative: Libyan Case Crowns First Year's
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to divert the vessel’s route to the port of Taranto, southern Italy, where the vessel was
searched.

Centrifuge components were found that were not listed in the cargo

manifest, and, therefore, confiscated.

The shipowner of the BBC China voluntarily

diverted her route to Italy and, thus the stop, search and seizure happened in port, in
internal waters.

Therefore, the seizure of parts of centrifuge was legal as of the

vessel’s faulty manifest and the location of seizure was in port where the coastal state
could exercise full sovereignty.76
After the incident, the United States and U.K. authorities were allowed to
inspect laboratories and factories for manufacturing weapons in Libya.77

Then, on

December 19, 2003, Muammar Qadhafi, Libya’s leader, announced that Libya would
eliminate all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon programmes.78

Therefore,

this incident has been repeatedly quoted by U.S. officials as a successful PSI
interdiction example because it is considered that the interdiction of the BBC China
shipment led to Libya giving up its WMD programmes.

For example, John Bolton,

then-U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
stated, “Exposure of the A.Q. Khan network this past year - helped along by the PSI
interdiction of nuclear materials aboard the BBC China and the subsequent decision
of Libya to forego its nuclear and other WMD programs - has brought to light the
breadth of the shadowy trading network in WMD.”79
However, it seems unclear whether Libya’s decision to give up the WMD
76

See Song, note 71 above, at 121.
See James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, note 75 above, at 25.; Wright, note 75
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programme was actually attributed to the BBC China’s interdiction.80

John Wolf,

who served as an assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation from 2001 to 2004,
states that the interdiction of the BBC China was “separate” from PSI and Libya’s
decision was attributed to the previous efforts to track and uncover the Khan
network.81

Moreover, a foreign official was quoted as saying “The BBC China

operation was carried out in the spirit of PSI, but it was not a PSI operation.”82
Winner has listed up possible reasons for Libya’s decision in addition to the incident:
UN-imposed sanctions in the wake of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing; the 2003 war in
Iraq; and the ongoing quiet diplomacy started during the Clinton administration by
the United States and the U.K.83

3.2. Territorial sea
A coastal state also enjoys its sovereignty beyond its land territory and
internal waters to “an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea” that does
not exceed 12 nautical miles.84

However, a coastal states’ sovereignty is limited

compared to the sovereignty over its land territory.

Article 17 of UNCLOS gives

“right of innocent passage” to ships of all states and, under Article 24, the coastal
states must not infringe the innocent passage of foreign vessel through the territorial
sea.85

Passage is deemed innocent, under Article 19 (1), as long as it is “not

80
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prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal States.”86

Passage

becomes prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal states under
Article 19 (2) if the vessel is engaged in the following activities:

(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any
other manner in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the
defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of
the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or

86

Ibid., Article 19(1)
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any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.

87

With this exhaustive list, however, transportation of WMD and the related
material are not included. 88

Even, Article 23 explicitly allows “foreign

nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or
noxious substances” to conduct innocent passage through the territorial sea as long as
they carry documents and take special precautionary measures that are
internationally agreed.89

This article is said to be a U.S.-led compromise with the

nations that wanted the Convention to state explicitly carriage of nuclear weapons in
foreign territorial seas to be non-innocent.90

Therefore, transportation of WMD and

the related materials in territorial seas are not deemed illegal activities under
UNCLOS.
On the other hand, Song discusses that it is reasonable to assume that WMD
or the related materials will not be used for peaceful purposes, therefore, the right of
innocent passage is lost.91

The author notes that the carriage and transportation of

87
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WMD or the related materials fit into the provisions that is prejudicial to the “peace,
good order or security” given in Article 19 (2)-(a), “the threat or use of force against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal state, or
in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations.”92

Moreover, under Article 301, when exercising

the right of innocent passage, the vessel has to “refrain from any threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” 93
Therefore, Song concludes, it is considered to be legal for coastal states to exercise
interdiction action against foreign-flagged vessels in their territorial seas if the vessel
is transporting WMD or the related materials.
However, in this case, it is necessary for the coastal state to have national
legislation that criminalize transportation of WMD and the related materials in its
territorial sea by stating that the vessel is threatening its “peace, good order or
security of the coastal States.”

Under Article 21, the coastal state may adopt laws

and regulations relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea with respect to,
for example, “the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic”, “the
protection of navigational aids and facilities”, “the preservation of the environment
of the coastal State”, and “the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws.”94

Although it is not explicitly stated in the given list

under Article 21 whether coastal states can adopt laws and regulations regarding the
transportation of WMD and the related materials, it might be possible for coastal
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states to adopt national laws and regulations that prohibit the transportation of WMD
and the related materials in its territorial sea if the coastal state makes certain relation
to the list given under Article 21 for the transportation of WMD and the related
materials.
However, under Article 32, warships and other government ships operated
for non-commercial purposes are protected by immunities. 95

Thus, when New

Zealand denied U.S. warships to enter its ports in 1985, the United States argued that
it was a violation of sovereign immunity.96

At that time, New Zealand demanded

U.S. warships to assure them that there were no nuclear weapons on board, however,
the United States replied that it did not confirm nor deny the presence or absence of
nuclear weapons on board.97
Moreover, under Article 24 (1)-(b), those new laws and regulations should
not be discriminatory against the vessels of any states or against vessels carrying
cargoes to, from or on behalf of any states.98

These notions clearly show the

difficulties of coastal states to adopt national laws and regulations that prohibit the
transportation of WMD and the related materials in its territorial sea as it would
contradict the immunity of warships that carry WMD.

Also, it should not be

possible to adopt such regulations and laws while the United States itself sends its
nuclear-powered warships or warships which carry nuclear weapons through out the
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world as this would cause a double standard.99
Therefore, although coastal states are encouraged to take appropriate action
to stop, search, and seize a vessel if it is reasonably suspected of carrying WMD or
the related materials in paragraph 4-d of the SOP, it is illegal for the coastal state to
do so.100

Coastal states cannot simply stop, search, and seize WMD or the related

materials in territorial seas just because the vessel in question is carrying them.
Therefore, the PSI activities encouraged in the SOP in the territorial sea are not
compatible with UNCLOS.

3.2.1. The Baltic Sky incident
On June 22, 2003, the Baltic Sky, flying the Comoros flag, was stopped and
searched by the Greek coast guard in its territorial sea while it was drifting in the
Mediterranean.101

The Greek authorities had been tracking the vessel for five days

before their investigation and they, naturally, wanted to know what the vessel was
doing between Turkey and Greece. On board, the authorities discovered about 680
tonnes of explosives and 8,000 detonators.

The vessel’s documents showed that the

cargo was destined for a company in Sudan, however, the address was proved to be a
post office and the company did not exist. The captain and crew, seven in total,
99
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100
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were charged with the illegal possession and transportation of explosives, moreover,
they were charged with failing to notify the Greek authorities 24 hours prior to their
transportation of explosives into Greek waters.102
While carrying explosives on board a cargo vessel is itself legal and not that
unusual, the action taken by the Greek authorities against the Baltic Sky was also
legal, under its domestic law, because the vessel was found to have faulty documents
and it had failed to notify the Greeks of the explosives 24 hours prior to its
transportation into Greek waters as required under its domestic law.

3.3. Contiguous Zone
The contiguous zone is an adjacent sea area to the territorial sea which “may
not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.”103

In the contiguous zone, under Article 33 (1) of

UNCLOS, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to:

(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.104

Therefore, in the contiguous zone, the coastal state jurisdiction is limited
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compared to the territorial sea and it can only exercise enforcement jurisdiction with
respect to “customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary” laws and regulations that would
occur in territory or territorial sea, not any offences made within the contiguous zone
itself.105

In order to stop, search, and seize a vessel which is suspected of carrying

WMD and the related materials in contiguous zone, the coastal state must have laws
and regulations that show that the carriage and transportation of WMD and the
related materials are infringing the coastal state’s customs law.106

In addition to

these laws and regulations, the vessel needs to navigate towards the coastal state or
depart from the coastal state so that the coastal state can stop, search, and seize the
cargo.107

As in the case of illegal drug trafficking by vessels, if there were such

laws and regulations for WMD interdiction in relation to customs, it would seem
possible to intercept the cargo in the contiguous zone. However, as previously
explained, there are difficulties to prohibit the transportation of WMD and the related
materials as this would contradict to Articles 19, 23, 24, and 32 of UNLOS.
Therefore, it is illegal for the coastal state to stop, search, and seize vessels which are
navigating in its contiguous zone because the carriage and transportation of WMD
and the related materials do not fall under any of the “customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations” which coastal states may exercise the control of.

3.4. Straits Used for International Navigation and Archipelagic seas
Under Article 38 of UNCLOS, all ships enjoy the right of transit passage in

105
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straits. 108

In the same article, “transit passage” is defined as “the exercise in

accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone”109

While ships can enjoy right of transit passage in

straits, they are, at the same time, given duties when exercising it. Under Article 39
(1) and (2), when exercising the right of transit passage, ships have to satisfy the
following criteria:

(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations;
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of
continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure
or by distress;
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part;
(e) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and
practices for safety at sea, including the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea;
(f) comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures and
108
109
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practices for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships.110

If the right of transit passage cannot be exercised in those straits used for
international navigation, under Article 45, the right of innocent passage applies
instead.111

As is the case for the right of innocent passage, the transportation of

WMD and the related materials does not fall under the activities that are “prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State” regulated in Article 19 (2).
There are also difficulties for states to identify whether the transportation of WMD
and the related materials would fall under Article 39 (1) and (2).112

Because, for

example, components of WMD could have a dual-use, either military use or
commercial use, it can not always be determined if there is a threat to littoral
states.113

Therefore, it is legally difficult for states to stop, search, and seize WMD

or the related materials in those straits used for international navigation.
In archipelagic seas, sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends, under
Article 49, to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance
with Article 47.

On the other hand, under Article 52, ships of all states enjoy the

same ‘right of innocent passage’ as they enjoy in the territorial sea.

The

archipelagic state, however, may suspend temporarily the innocent passage of foreign
ships “if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security.”114
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suspension will take effect only after it is duly published.115

Under Article 53, an

archipelagic state may designate sea lanes and air routes “suitable for the continuous
and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic
waters and the adjacent territorial sea.”116
The right of innocent passage in archipelagic seas must be in accordance with
Part II, section 3 of UNCLOS which regulates innocent passage in the territorial
sea.117

Therefore, just as in the territorial sea, if a state wants to stop, search, or

seize a vessel which is carrying and transporting WMD and the related materials, the
state has to have its reasoning under Article 19 (2) noting that the passage is
“prejudicial to the peace, good order or security” of the coastal state. However, as
previously explained, the transportation of WMD and the related material are not
included in the list of Article 19 (2).

Thus, again, states cannot legally stop, search,

and seize WMD or the related materials in archipelagic seas just because the vessel
in question is carrying them.

Therefore, the PSI activities encouraged in the SOP

are not compatible with UNCLOS in archipelagic seas.

3.5. Exclusive Economic Zone
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea.118

The EEZ cannot extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the

baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. In the EEZ the
coastal state has sovereign rights over living and non-living natural resources.
115
116
117
118
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Moreover, the coastal state can exercise jurisdiction with respect to:

(a) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(b) marine scientific research;
(c) the protection and preservation of the marine environment.119

The EEZ is particularly designed for economic benefits such as fishing and
oil mining that the coastal state’s can enjoy.

However, when the coastal state

exercises its rights and duties in the EEZ, it must have “due regard to the rights and
duties of other States” and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of
UNCLOS.120
When it comes to the interdiction of WMD, it seems that the coastal state
lacks good reasoning. The coastal state might try to conduct interdiction of WMD
as stating it is for “the protection and preservation of the marine environment,”
however, unless the vessel is actually polluting the ocean, it would not be likely to
have sufficient justification.121

Under Article 211 (5), coastal states may “adopt

laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from
vessels” in the EEZ, however, only when there are clear grounds for believing that a
vessel may commit “substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution
of the marine environment”, may the coastal state conduct a physical inspection of
the vessel.122
119
120
121
122
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vessel which is carrying and transporting WMD and the related materials in the
EEZ.123

3.6. High Seas
The High Seas are “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic states.”124

Under Article 87, all states enjoy

“freedom of the high seas” and that includes the “freedom of navigation.”125

While

ships are enjoying their freedom of navigation on the high seas, they have to have
nationality and fly the flag of their nationality.126
to the flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction.127
has jurisdiction over that vessel.

On the high seas, ships are subject

Thus, only the flag state of the vessel

However, under Article 110, warships are justified

to conduct “right of visit” if there is reasonable ground for suspecting the following
items:

(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of

71 above, at 118.
123
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the warship has jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.128

Accordingly, as long as there are the justifications above, warships can visit
a ‘foreign-flagged’ vessel.

This is an exception of flag state exclusive jurisdiction

regulated under Article 92.129

However, the conditions given under Article 110 do

not include the carriage and transportation of WMD or the related materials.
Therefore, even if a state ‘A’ receives intelligence reports that a vessel of flag state
‘B’ is conducting the transportation of WMD and the related materials on the high
seas, a warship of state ‘A’ does not have the justification to stop and visit the vessel.
Only a warship of state ‘B’ can conduct a right of visit to the vessel as a flag state.
In the case of the So San incident, it was navigating without a flag and its
identification marking was painted over, it was a “lawless, stateless vessel.” 130
Hence, the boarding conducted by the Spanish Navy was justified under Article 110
(1)-(d).131

However, they could not seize the scud missiles as there was no legal

ground to seize them.
The PSI has been set up through a U.S. initiative following this So San
incident.

Still, it does not provide new legal authority to the United States and other

participating states, and interdiction operations must be made under international law.
128
129
130
131

Ibid., Article 110.
Ibid., Article 92.
Shanker, note 1 above.
UNCLOS, Article 110(1)-(d).

42

It is still not allowed for the PSI participants to stop, search, and seize WMD or
related material on the high seas just because vessels are transporting them.

The

PSI activities must follow flag state jurisdiction. Hence, paragraph 4 (d) of the SOP
confines states’ interdiction activities to their own flag on the high seas.

At their own initiative or at the request and good cause shown by another
state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their
internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any
other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such
cargoes that are identified.132 (Italic added by author for emphasis)

If the state ‘A’ makes an agreement with state ‘B’, state ‘A’ can take specific
action on a vessel from the flag of state ‘B’ which is transporting WMD and the
related materials on the high seas under the consent of the flag state. (‘Boarding
Agreement’ will be discussed in section 3.7. of this paper.)

The flag state can

authorize the PSI participant to conduct boarding on a ship flying its flag.

This

notion seems to work well if those agreements are expanded broadly, however, it will
probably not provide complete assurance for the state. Because considering that
warships, and vessels owned or operated by a state and used only on government
non-commercial service have “complete immunity” on the high seas from the
jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state, under Articles 95 and 96, thus, such
132

SOP (note 11 above).
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vessels would not be stopped even if they are transporting WMD or the related
materials.133

Thus, if the “states of proliferation concerns” uses its warships for

transporting WMD and the related materials, there is no way to hamper it.
There is discussion, nevertheless, that the interdiction activities on the high
seas could be justified under the purpose of the high seas.134

Article 88 states that

“[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.”135

Moreover, Article 301

states;

In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this
Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.136

Accordingly, the freedom of navigation on the high seas provided under
Article 87 can be limited to the peaceful uses of the high seas and states should not
make any threats to any states.137

The PSI participants may possibly claim that the

use of the high seas for transportation of WMD or the related materials are against
“peaceful purposes.

However, considering that U.S. nuclear-powered warships or

warships carrying nuclear arms are navigating the world’s oceans, it is unlikely that

133
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the PSI participants will seek justification of interdiction of WMD or the related
materials on the high seas to these Articles.138

3.6.1. The Yin He incident
In July 1993, the Chinese vessel Yin He, departed from a port in China
bound for Iran, was suspected by the United States of carrying an illicit cargo of
thiodiglycol, a mustard gas base, and thionyl chloride, used in nerve gas.139

The Yin

He was ordered to follow a U.S. warship while military aircraft took aerial photos of
it.

It was, then, lead to the port of Damman, Saudi Arabia where an inspection of

the cargo was carried out between August 26 and September 4, 1993, by Saudi
Arabian officials and American technical experts in the presence of Chinese officials.
The result showed that the Yin He was carrying purely commercial chemicals and
nothing related to WMD, thus, it was allowed to go on its way.

Consequently,

China accused the United States of its infringing China's sovereignty and its right of
freedom of navigation in international waters.
The Yin He was ordered, on the high seas, to follow the U.S. warship
without the consensus of China, the flag state, even though it was just carrying
chemicals for commercial use.

Therefore, this incident was most likely an illegal

act under Article 110; any action or status of the Yin He did not fall under it.
138
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time of the incident, neither the United States nor China were party to UNCLOS,
accordingly, customary international law would be applicable.140

Thus, on the high

seas, the freedom of navigation and the exclusive jurisdiction of a flag state over
vessels that are flying its flag should be assured, and the final result would be the
same.141

3.7. Boarding Agreement
As has been previously seen, it appears that the PSI activities encouraged in
the SOP to prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials
worldwide, contain several incompatibilities with UNCLOS.

The PSI will not give

any new legal power to the PSI participants, on the contrary, the PSI activities must
still be conducted under international law and regime.

Nevertheless, paragraph 4

(c) of the SOP seeks to find its way by asking the PSI participants “[t]o seriously
consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and
searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such
WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.”142

On

the high seas, a flag state holds exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag,
however, if the flag state comes to a consensus with state ‘A’ for boarding and
searching its flagged vessels, state ‘A’ can board and search the vessels. Therefore,
the United States has been signing bilateral boarding agreements with several states
so that it can take the necessary actions to interdict WMD or the related materials on

140
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the high seas under the consent of the flag state.143

This boarding agreement in

accordance with the PSI is modeled following similar arrangements that are set, for
example, to counter drug smuggling.144
On February 11, 2004, the United States and Liberia, the world’s second
largest shipping registry, signed an agreement on ship boarding in accordance with
the PSI.145

Under this agreement, authorities on a bilateral basis are given to board

vessels suspected of carrying illicit shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, or
related materials. Article 4, Operations in International Waters, of the agreement
states:

Whenever the Security Force Officials of one Party (“the requesting
Party”) encounter a suspect vessel claiming nationality in the other Party
(“the requested Party”) located seaward of any State’s territorial sea, the
requesting Party may request through the Competent Authority of the
requested Party that it:
a. confirm the claim of nationality of the suspect vessel; and
b. if such claim is confirmed:
i. authorize the boarding and search of the suspect vessel, cargo

143
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and the persons found on board by Security Force Officials of the
requesting Party; and
ii. if evidence of proliferation is found, authorize the Security
Force Officials of the requesting Party to detain the vessel, as well
as items and persons on board, pending instructions conveyed
through the Competent Authority of the requested Party as to the
actions the requesting Party is permitted to take concerning such
items, persons and vessels.146

Under the request of “the requesting Party”, “the requested Party” has to
respond to such requests within ‘two hours’.147

If “the requested Party” can not

respond to such requests within two hours, “the requesting Party will be deemed to
have been authorized to board the suspect vessel for the purpose of inspecting the
vessel’s documents, questioning the persons on board, and searching the vessel to
determine if it is engaged in proliferation by sea.” 148

Therefore, under the

agreement, the United States can interdict a suspected vessel, flagged in Liberia, with
the consent of Liberia, and if there is no response from Liberia within two hours, the
United States can deem that Liberia has given its authorization to the United States
and conduct boarding and search the vessel.
Following the bilateral agreement between the United States and Liberia, the
146
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United States has signed similar agreements with Panama (May 12, 2004),149 the
Marshall Islands (August 13, 2004),150 Croatia (June 1, 2005),151 Cyprus (July 25,
2005),152 Belize (August 4, 2005),153 Malta (March 15, 2007),154 and Mongolia
(October 23, 2007).155

As of January 1, 2007, the combination of states with which

the United States has made boarding agreements and the PSI participants account for
more than 60 % of the world’s commercial fleet (100 gross tonnage and above) in
dead-weight tonnage.156

With such a large coverage of the worldwide ship registry,

the bilateral ship boarding agreement may increase the probability for the PSI
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participants to stop, search, and seize suspected vessels that are transporting WMD or
the related materials.157

Thus, the United States has made agreements with the

major flags of registry states.

If this partnership within the PSI participants goes

well, Bolton’s statement might hold true; “[o]ur goal is to work with other concerned
states to develop new means to disrupt the proliferation trade at sea, in the air, and on
land. … Over time, we will extend this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the
world’s most destructive weapons away from our shores and out of the hand of our
enemies.”158
However, there are several critics of this ship boarding agreement.
Valencia states that the flag-state consent regime is the fundamental principles of
international law and “it cannot be overturned or eroded by the practice of a few
countries over such a short period of time.”159

Chaffee notes that bilateral ship

boarding agreements have “the potential for eroding the multilateral framework
pursued through UNCLOS.”160
Moreover, if a vessel is registered in a state which has not concluded an
agreement with the PSI participants, the vessel would not be stopped, searched, and
seized even if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel is carrying
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WMD or the related materials.161

Moreover, if the vessel is a warship, or owned or

operated by a government as a non-commercial service, it has complete immunity
from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state.162

Therefore, if a

suspected vessel is registered in North Korea or Iran, it is unlikely that the PSI
participants will stop, search, and seize the vessel.163

Thus, it seems that the PSI

activities still contain a “big hole.”164
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CHAPTER 4. IMPLICATION OF THE 2005 SUA CONVENTION
IN THE PSI PERSPECTIVE
The introduction of the PSI has made a great impact on the worldwide trend
of counter-terrorism; however, it does not give any new legal authority to its
participants.

On the contrary, the PSI activities must still be conducted under

international law and regime.

Therefore, as has been demonstrated in the previous

chapter, PSI activities contain several incompatibilities with UNCLOS.

Therefore,

the United States has been signing bilateral boarding agreements to overcome the
controversial issues pertaining to UNCLOS.
In order to legally prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials worldwide, it is necessary to include authorities for the interdiction
activities into the international legal framework.

Therefore, along with signing

bilateral agreements, the United States has been attempting to seek their legal
authority in the SUA Convention by amending the instrument since 2002.
Consequently, two SUA Protocols were introduced in October 2005.

This Chapter

will examine how these new 2005 SUA Protocols will strengthen the PSI activities.
Towards this aim, the chapter will first review the development of the 2005 SUA
Convention, and, secondly, examine its two key provisions: the criminalization of
WMD and the boarding provisions.

Finally, the chapter will examine the

implications of the 2005 SUA Convention for the PSI activities.
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4.1. Development of the 2005 SUA Convention
4.1.1. The Achille Lauro incident
On October 7, 1985, four armed Palestinian terrorists, members of the
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), hijacked the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro which was carrying more than
400 passengers and crew while en route from Alexandria, Egypt to Italy.165

They

originally planned to bring their arms and explosives secretly into Israel, however,
when they were discovered on board the vessel, they took passengers and crew
hostage and evolved into hijackers.

The hijackers threatened to kill passengers

unless Israel released 50 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Their demands were
not met and consequently, the following afternoon, the hijackers killed a handicapped
Jewish, American citizen, and threw his body, with his wheelchair, into the sea.
Negotiations followed with the result that the hijackers surrendered at Port Said,

165
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Proshanto K. Mukherjee, Maximo Quibranza Mejia Jr, and Gotthard M. Gauci (World Maritime
University, Malmö, Sweden: WMU Publication, 2002), 157-58.; Brad J. Kieserman, "Preventing
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Egypt on October 10 with a guarantee of safe passage out of Egypt.

They were then

sent to Tunisia by an official Egyptian airplane. However, under pressure from the
United States, the Tunisian government could not allow the airplane to land in their
country and, eventually, U.S. Navy fighters forced it to land at a NATO airbase in
Sicily, Italy where the Italian authorities took custody of the hijackers.166

4.1.2. Development of SUA Convention
Following the Achille Lauro incident, Resolution A.584(14), Measures to
prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their
passengers and crews, was adopted at International Maritime Organization (IMO) on
November 20, 1985 with concern for “the danger to passengers and crews resulting
from the increasing number of incidents involving piracy, armed robbery and other
unlawful acts against or on board ships, including small craft, both at anchor and
under way.”167

The resolution sought the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to

develop detailed and practical technical measures to ensure the security of passengers
and crew on board vessels. 168

Moreover, on December 9, 1985, the General

Assembly of the UN requested IMO “to study the problem of terrorism aboard or
against ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures”
under its resolution A/RES/40/61. 169

In September 1986, the MSC issued its

166
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circular, MSC/Circ.443, Measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and
crews on board ships, in which governments, port authorities, administrations,
shipowners, shipmasters, and crews were requested to take appropriate measures
against unlawful acts threatening passengers and crews on board vessels.170
In November 1986, following the process above, the government of Austria,
Egypt, and Italy proposed a draft convention to the IMO on the subject of unlawful
acts against the safety of maritime navigation.171

Then, based on this proposal, a

conference held in Rome in March 1988 adopted the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention).
The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed
Platform Located on the Continental Shelf (SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms) was
also adopted at the same time.

The main purpose of the SUA Convention and SUA

Protocol for Fixed Platforms is “to provide an international legal basis for action to
be taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships and fixed platforms
located on the continental shelf.”172

In the SUA Convention, these unlawful acts

include “the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against persons on board
ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are likely to destroy or
damage it.”173

The SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms contains similar provisions as

in the SUA Convention, relating to the unlawful acts which are committed against

170
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fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.

The SUA Convention and its

protocol define offences in Article 3 and Article 2, respectively, and require each
State Party to take the necessary measures for establishing jurisdiction over the
offences.
Both the SUA Convention and SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms entered
into force on March 1, 1992. As of June 2008, the number of contracting174 states
for the SUA Convention is 149, representing 92.75 % of world tonnage and for
the SUA protocol for Fixed Platforms 138 contracting states, representing 87.77 %
of the world tonnage.175

4.1.3. Development of the 2005 SUA Protocols
Following the tragic events of 9/11, 2001, the UN General Assembly and
Security Council adopted resolutions A/RES/56/1 and S/RES/1368, on September 18
and 12, respectively, condemning the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.176
Further, the Security Council adopted Resolution S/RES/1373 on September 28,
requesting the international community to strengthen its effort to prevent and
174
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instruments.
175
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suppress terrorist acts, including the full implementation of anti-terrorist
conventions. 177

Taking the UN resolutions, the IMO assembly adopted its

Resolution A.924(22), Review of Measures and Procedures to Prevent Acts of
Terrorism Which Threaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and the Safety of
Ships, on November 20, which requested the Maritime Safety Committee, the Legal
Committee, and the Facilitation Committee to review existing international legal and
technical measures to see whether there was a need to update the relevant IMO
instruments or to create new measures in order to prevent and suppress terrorism
against vessels and to improve security aboard and ashore.178
Accordingly, the Legal Committee started the review of the SUA
Convention in 2002 and the following issues, inter alia, were considered as the scope
of the review of the Convention:

-

revision and expansion of the offences in article 3 to ensure that a wider
range of unlawful acts are covered by the Convention in the light of the
experience of 11 September;

-

enlarging the scope of application to cover domestic cabotage
navigation; and

-

widening/strengthening the regulations on jurisdiction and extradition,
including for instance, making it obligatory not to use the political
offence exception in order to deny extradition.179
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Subsequently, the United States and Turkey submitted a proposal for
amending the SUA Convention at the 84th session of the Legal Committee.180

The

United States suggested, inter alia, for the amendment to: clearly address prohibiting
activities which “knowingly and unlawfully” provide international maritime
transportation to persons, or for supplies that are committing SUA offences; address
the issue of transportation of WMD and their means of delivery which is in violation
of applicable international non-proliferation agreements; criminalize using the ship
or its cargo as a weapon.181
During its 85th session, October 21 - 25, 2002, the Committee discussed,
inter alia, seven proposed offences which could be added to the SUA Convention;
four of them concerned activities taking place on the ship or directed towards a ship
involved in terrorist acts; one concerned the presence of tools or substances on a ship
useful for WMD; and two of the new offences concerned the use of the ship for
transporting of WMD related material.182

At this session, Japan commented that the

proposal submitted by the United States considerably exceeded the scope of the SUA
Convention and Protocol, and some of the offences had already been criminalized by
other conventions.183

The 86th session, April 28 - May 2, 2003, discussed, inter

alia, to insert a reference to the protection of rights and freedoms of seafarers in the
proposal.184

The review of the SUA Convention was continued on a priority basis
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in the 87th session, October 13-17, 2003.

At the subsequent 88th session, April

19-23, 2004, while most of the delegations supported the revision of the SUA
Convention, several delegations cautioned that the 2005 SUA Protocols would not
jeopardize the principle of freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage
which are guaranteed in UNCLOS and it would not cause unnecessary disturbance of
international commercial navigation.185

At the 89th session, October 25-29, 2004,

and 90th session, April 18-29, 2005, the review work was finalized to prepare for the
diplomatic conference scheduled in October 2005.
Following three years of discussion, the diplomatic conference was held on
October 10-14, 2005 and duly adopted the amendments in the form of two protocols
on October 15; the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005 Protocol to the SUA
Convention) and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf
(2005 Protocol to the SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms).186
185
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the SUA Convention contain two key features:
-

broadening the range of offences in Article 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater; and

-

introducing the provisions which allow states to board a vessel, which is
suspected of committing an offence provided in Article 3bis, 3ter, and
3quater, flying the flag of a Parties to the 2005 SUA Convention on the
high seas in Article 8bis.
Although the process for amendment for the SUA Convention began at the

84th session in 2002, that is before the PSI’s principles (SOP) were announced in
2003, the two key features of the 2005 Protocols to the SUA Convention and the
SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms have very close relationships with the PSI
activities. Firstly, the new Convention criminalizes transportation of WMD and the
related materials under Article 3bis(b), which the United States and like-minded
countries have been craving as a legal basis for the interdiction of WMD and the
related materials in the PSI activities, and secondly, the newly added provision
regarding the boarding of suspected vessels on the high seas contain exactly the same
notion as the boarding agreement which the United States has been proceeding since
it made an agreement with Liberia in February 2004.

4.2. Key provisions of the 2005 SUA Convention for PSI activities
4.2.1. Criminalization of transportation of WMD
The 2005 SUA Convention provides a definition for biological weapons,
chemical weapons, and nuclear (BCN) weapons, namely WMD, in Article 1(d) (See

60

Appendix D for extract of the 2005 SUA Convention). 187

The definition of

biological weapons is extracted from Article I of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 1972 (BWC), which entered into force in
1975, likewise, the definition of chemical weapons is extracted from Article II(1) and
(9) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 1993 (CWC),
which entered into force in 1997.
Under Article 3bis(b), “transport” 188 of certain materials is newly
criminalized as follows.

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this
Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally:
….
(b) transports on board a ship:

(i)

any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is
intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or
without a condition, as is provided for under national law,
death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of
intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any

187
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188
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61

act; or
(ii)

any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as
defined in article 1; or

(iii)

any source material, special fissionable material, or
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material,
knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear explosive
activity or in any other nuclear activity not under safeguards
pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement; or

(iv)

any equipment, materials or software or related
technology that significantly contributes to the design,
manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the
intention that it will be used for such purpose.189

However, as the text shows, each act would become an offence under certain
conditions. For offence (i), the subject should know that “it is intended to be used
to cause, or in a threat to cause, … death or serious injury or damage for the purpose
of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”190

For offence (ii), the subject

should know that it is BCN weapons as defined in Article 1. For offence (iii), the
subject should know that said materials are “intended to be used in a nuclear
explosive activity … not under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive
189
190

2005 SUA Convention, Article 3bis(b).
Ibid.
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safeguards agreement.” 191

For offence (iv), the subject should know that said

materials would “contribute(s) to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN
weapon.”192

Therefore, for example, if a person transports WMD related materials

without knowing that it is such, the person does not commit an offence.

The person

should “unlawfully and intentionally” commit the action stated under the Article for
it to be an offence.193
Moreover, the “saving clause” is made in Articles 2bis and 3bis(2) (See
Appendix D).

Article 2bis states, “[n]othing in this Convention shall affect the

rights, obligations and responsibilities” of state parties under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), BWC, and CWC.194

Further, Article

3bis(2) states, “it shall not be an offence within the meaning of this Convention to
transport an item or material covered by Paragraph 1(b)(iii) or, … , paragraph
1(b)(iv), if such item or material is transported to or from the territory of, or is
otherwise transported under the control of, a State Party” to the NPT.195

It must be

noted, however, that India emphasized that the “saving clause” discriminates against
the non-State parties to the NPT and hampers the right of those countries pursuing
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.196

Although there is a certain compromise for

criminalizing the transportation of WMD, it was included as it is in the current 2005
191
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193
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SUA Convention with the support of Canada, France, the U.K., and the United
States197
Other provisions under Article 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater (See Appendix D)
regulate offences, inter alia, in which a person is unlawfully and intentionally, “to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization
to do or to abstain from doing any act”; “transport[ing] another person on board a
ship knowing that the person has committed an act that constitute an offence” in
Article 3, 3bis, or 3quater, or any other offences in other treaties listed in Annex of
the Convention; “injur[ing] or kill[ing] any person in connection with the
commission of any of the offences” in Article 3, 3bis, or 3quater or any other
offences in other treaties listed in the Annex of the Convention.
Under Article 5 (See Appendix D), states are required to make the offences
provided in Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater punishable by appropriate penalties
taking into account the grave nature of those offences.198

Moreover, under Article

5bis (See Appendix D) states are required to take necessary measures to enable a
legal entity located in its territory to be liable under its domestic law when a person
responsible for management or control of that legal entity has committed an offence
in this Convention.199
The prohibition of the transportation of WMD in the 2005 SUA Convention
greatly supports the PSI activities and gives the PSI its legal backbone.

States can

exercise “right of visit” to a vessel on the high seas, under Article 110 of UNCLOS,

197
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if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the vessel is engaging in piracy,
the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, or without nationality; although if flying a
foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the vessel is, in reality, of the same
nationality as a warship.200

However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the conditions

given under Article 110 do not include the carriage and transportation of WMD or
the related materials. Thus, as in the So San case, states might visit the vessel of a
foreign flag on the high seas under the condition of Article 110 of UNCLOS,
however, states could not condemn the carriage of WMD and there is no legal ground
to seize the cargo, WMD and the related materials.

States can, now, condemn the

transportation of WMD and the related materials as an offence according to the 2005
SUA Convention if the transporting state is not a party to NPT.

4.2.2. Boarding provisions
The newly added Article 8bis (See Appendix D) provides a comprehensive
set of procedures and protections with respect to ship boarding by the third party to
prevent and suppress unlawful acts under this Convention.

Under Article 8bis(1),

state parties are required to co-operate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and
suppress unlawful acts covered by the Convention.201

Article 8bis(4) allows a state

party to request the assistance of other state parties in preventing or suppressing an
offence that is established under Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater if there is reasonable
grounds to suspect that the offence has been, is being, or is about to be committed on

200
201
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a vessel flying its flag.202

Following the request, the requested parties are required

to render assistance with the means available to them.203
Under Article 8bis(5), whenever a state party (the requesting Party)
encounters a vessel flying the flag of another state party (the flag State) in the
seaward of any State’s territorial seas (EEZ or on the high seas), and if the requesting
Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel has been, is, or is about to be
involved in committing an offence under Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater, and the
requesting party desires to board the suspect vessel, the requesting Party and the flag
State are placed under certain obligations as follow:
-

the requesting Party requests the flag state to confirm the nationality of
the suspect vessel;

-

if the nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party requests the flag state
to authorize to board and to take appropriate measures which may include
stopping, boarding and searching the vessel and questioning the person on
board;

-

the flag state is required to, either, give the authorization to the requesting
Party to board and to take appropriate measures; conduct the boarding and
search on its own or together with the requesting Party; or decline to
authorize a boarding and search.204

Therefore, the requesting Party cannot board and take appropriate measures without
the flag state’s consent even if it has reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel has

202
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been, is, or is about to be involved in committing an offence under Article 3, 3bis,
3ter, or 3quater; this is compatible with the provision set under UNCLOS. On the
high seas, vessels are subject to flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction under Article 92 of
UNCLOS, thus, only the flag state of the vessel can exercise jurisdiction on the
vessel.
However, the new 2005 SUA Convention would change the notion of this
flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, when it enters into force.

Article

8bis(5)(d) states:

Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General
that, with respect to ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry,
the requesting Party is granted authorization to board and search the ship,
its cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on board in
order to locate and examine documentation of its nationality and
determine if an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has
been, is being or is about to be committed, if there is no response from
the first Party within four hours of acknowledgement of receipt of a
request to confirm nationality.205

Therefore, the requesting party would be granted the authorization to board
and search the suspected vessel if there is no response from the flag state within ‘four
205

Ibid., paragraph(5)(d).
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hours’ of the request, under the condition that the flag state notifies the
Secretary-General of IMO of such an arrangement upon or after becoming a party.
Under, Article 8bis(5)(e), a state party can even give its authorization to the
requesting party ‘automatically’ if the requesting party finds an offence set forth in
Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater has been, is being, or is about to be committed, by
notifying the Secretary-General of IMO of such arrangement upon or after becoming
a party.

With this sub-paragraph (e), the requesting party does not, even, need to

wait for four hours to get the authorization from the flag state.

However, the flag

state can withdraw these arrangements set under sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) at any
time. 206

Nevertheless, these two sub-paragraphs bring a certain change to the

notion of the flag states’ exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.

At the 88th session

of the Legal Committee, however, it was recognized that the principle of flag state
jurisdiction must be respected to the utmost extent and a boarding by another state on
the high seas may take place in “exceptional circumstances.”207

As such, some

delegations showed their concern that the notion of “tacit acceptance” for boarding
was not acceptable as it was inconsistent with the exclusive flag state jurisdiction set
under Article 92 of UNCLOS and if “tacit acceptance” was to be allowed, it should
be in the form of an “opt-in” clause.208
Taking the concern of the flag state’s exclusive jurisdiction into account, the
following sub-paragraphs duly paying attention to it.

For example, under Article

8bis(6), the flag state may authorize the requesting party to detain the vessel, cargo
206

Ibid., and sub-paragraph (e).
IMO, LEG88/13., paragraph 66.
208
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and persons on board and the requesting party is required to inform the flag state of
the results of a boarding.209

Moreover, under paragraph (7), the requesting party

cannot take any additional measures without the express authorization of the flag
state.210

Further, paragraph (8) confirms that the flag state has the right to exercise

jurisdiction over a vessel for seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution although it
can consent to a requesting state to exercise the jurisdiction.211
Paragraphs (6) and (8) cast quite important notions on the PSI activities.
As the So San incident indicated, states could exercise the “right of visit” to a vessel
on the high seas if the conditions set under Article 110 of UNCLOS are met, however,
there was no clear authority to seize the cargo. However, paragraphs (6) and (8)
allow states to exercise jurisdiction for detainment, seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and
prosecution if the flag state authorizes it.

Therefore, states may seize WMD and the

related material on board a foreign flagged vessel on the high seas.

The 2005 SUA

Convention will provide quite a strong legal basis to the WMD interdiction operation
of the PSI, when it enters into force.

4.3. Implications of the 2005 SUA Convention for PSI
4.3.1. Strengthening PSI activities
By adopting the 2005 SUA Convention the transportation of WMD and the
related material is criminalized under Article 3bis(b), although there is a condition
that the person should “unlawfully and intentionally” commit the offence under the

209
210
211

2005 SUA Convention, Article 8bis(6).
Ibid., paragraph (7).
Ibid., paragraph (8).
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Article.

Moreover, under Article 8bis states are given a strong legal basis to stop,

search, and seize WMD and the related material on board a foreign flagged vessel on
the high seas if the flag state authorizes them to do so.

As long as there is a flag

state’s authorization, a state might have taken appropriate measures on a vessel
which is carrying WMD and the related materials even before the 2005 SUA
Convention was adopted, however, clear legislation in an international convention
which provides a comprehensive set of procedures and protections with respect to
ship boarding surely strengthens the worldwide trend of counter-terrorism and the
PSI activities.
The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) affirms that the
proliferation of WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security and
calls for all states to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of
WMD.212

The UN Security Council resolution was proposed by the United States

to criminalize the proliferation of WMD,213 although the phrase to ‘criminalize the
proliferation of weapons’ was not included when it was adopted.

The draft of the

resolution, moreover, contained the explicit term ‘to interdict,’ however, this was also
changed to the phrase ‘to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking’ after
China’s objections.214

It thus seems that the United States and like-minded states

finally succeeded in its attempt to ‘criminalize’ the transportation of WMD in the
2005 SUA Convention.

212
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4.3.2. Considerations of the 2005 SUA Convention
Although the 2005 SUA Convention is expected to strengthen the curtailing
of the proliferation of WMD, it still entails issues to be considered. Firstly, the
scope of the SUA Convention does not necessarily fit into the scope of
non-proliferation activities.215

The non-proliferation activities encouraged under

UN Security Council 1540 and the PSI are aimed to achieve “international peace and
security.”216

On the contrary, the scope of the SUA Convention is to provide an

international legal basis for action to be taken against persons committing unlawful
acts against “the safety of maritime navigation”, which was sought following the
Achille Lauro incident. While the transportation of WMD and the related material
certainly falls under the threat to “international peace and security,” it does not
necessarily cause any danger to the “safety of maritime navigation.”217

This is why

Japan, as previously seen, cautioned from the very early stage of the amendment
process that the proposal of the United States considerably exceeds the scope of the
current SUA Convention. 218

Moreover, some delegations suggested it is more

desirable to develop a new convention rather than a protocol form amending the
original convention.219

Further, others showed their concerns that the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
215
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Weapons (OPCW) are more appropriate places to discuss non-proliferation issues
rather than IMO.220
Secondly, under Article 2, the Convention does not apply to a warship, or a
vessel owned or operated by a state when used as a naval auxiliary or for customs or
police.

Moreover, Article 2(2) states, “Nothing in this Convention affects the

immunities of warships and other Government vessels operated for non-commercial
purposes.”221

These provisions reserve compatibility with Articles 95 and 96 of

UNCLOS which regulate the “complete immunity” of warships, and vessels owned
or operated by a State and used only in government non-commercial services on the
high seas. 222

Accordingly, if ‘states of proliferation concern’ use their own

government vessels for transporting WMD and the related materials, no state can
intervene in their ‘unlawful’223 acts as it would not be an unlawful act within the
context of this Convention.

Moreover, as already seen, the “saving clause” has

been included in Articles 2bis and 3bis(2).

Therefore, if a state is a party to the NPT,

the transportation of WMD and the related materials would not be an offence within
the meaning of this Convention.
Thirdly, pessimistic views can be perceived for the entry into force of two
2005 SUA Protocols.
the instruments.

Two 2005 SUA Protocols apply only to those state parties to

It is easily estimated that those ‘states of proliferation concern’

220
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222
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would not be likely to ratify the Convention. Moreover, it is unlikely that states
which are not party to the NPT would become a party to the 2005 SUA Protocols.
It was seen previously, that India strongly objected to the saving clause because it
would be discriminatory to non-state parties to those treaties.224

In order to stop,

search, board, and seize a vessel, not only the ‘requesting state,’ but also the
‘requested state (flag state)’ surely needs to be a party to the 2005 SUA Protocols.
The 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention will enter into force ninety days after the
date on which twelve states have “either signed it without reservation as to
ratification, acceptance or approval, or have deposited an instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General.”225

For the 2005

Protocol to the SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms, it requires ratification from three
States which are also parties to the SUA Protocol for Fixed Platforms, however, it
will not enter into force before the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention has entered
into force.226

As of June 6, 2008, six states have signed the 2005 Protocol to the

SUA Convention and four states the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Protocol for Fixed
Platforms.227

However, none of the above signatures is operative.228

4.3.3. Correlation between the 2005 SUA Convention and boarding
agreement
The provisions which are newly set in the 2005 SUA Convention use quite

224
225
226
227
228
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similar language to that used in the bilateral boarding agreements which the United
States has been proceeding since 2004 to enhance its PSI activities.229

For example,

Article 4(3)(d) of the boarding agreement which the United States made with Liberia
states;

[I]f there is no response from the Competent Authority of the requested
Party [flag state] within two hours of its acknowledgment of receipt of
the request, the requesting Party will be deemed to have been authorized
to board the suspect vessel for the purpose of inspecting the vessel’s
documents, questioning the persons on board, and searching the vessel
to determine if it is engaged in proliferation by sea.230 (Italics added by
author for emphasis)

Two-hours is set in the case of the boarding agreement between the United
States and Liberia for deemed authorization if there is no response for the request of
the requesting party. Moreover, under Article 5 of the agreement, the flag state may
even waive its right to exercise jurisdiction over detainment, seizure, forfeiture,
arrest, and prosecution and authorize the enforcement of the requesting party’s law
against the vessel. 231

This boarding agreement already entered into force on

December 9, 2004. As previously indicated, the United States has signed similar
boarding agreements with Panama, the Marshall Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Belize,

229
230
231

See discussion in Chapter 3, 3.7.
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Ibid., Article 5.
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Malta, and Mongolia, and those boarding agreements, except Mongolia, have already
entered into force.232 By making a boarding agreement, the issue of flag state
jurisdiction on the high seas can be overcome.

Moreover, the United States does

not need to wait for the slow ratification pace of the 2005 SUA Convention and its
entry into force.

It seems that ship boarding agreements allow more dynamic PSI

operations than the 2005 SUA Convention would provide. That is why, the United
States has been consecutively processing the agreements with the major flags of
registry countries.

232

See Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, note 143 above.
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CHAPTER 5. RESPONSES TO THE PSI IN THE EAST ASIAN
REGION
The notion of non-proliferation of WMD seems to have been acknowledged
world wide as a precaution against terrorism, especially after the tragic incident of
9/11.

It is also a great concern among the states in the East Asian region where one

of the “proliferation concern states” is located.233

Although the PSI activities are in

line with non-proliferation of WMD, the perceptions of the initiative that each
country has seem to be different.

In this section, the responses of the major

countries in the East Asian region towards the PSI will be overviewed.

5.1. Japan
Japan, as the only country that has suffered from the tragic use of atomic
bombs, has been pursuing global disarmament and non-proliferation to achieve
international peace and security.234

Japan sees the PSI as consistent with Japanese

efforts towards the non-proliferation of WMD, delivery system, and the related
materials, and, as such, joined the initiative at its establishment.235
233

Moreover, Japan

Glosserman introduces the importance of the East Asian region from economic point of view.
Brad Glosserman, "An Action Plan to Counter the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
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234
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has been involved in the development of the principles of the PSI, the SOP, published
in Paris in 2003, and actively engaged in PSI activities.
In 2003, Japan attended the first PSI exercise, called “PACIFIC
PROTECTOR,” which was held in the Coral Sea off of Australia during September
10-13, and hosted by Australia, with France, Japan, and the United States
participating.236

In October 2004, Japan hosted the PSI exercise “TEAM SAMURAI

04” with the same five countries that had participated in the “PACIFIC
PROTECTOR,” participating in the exercise. Originally, this exercise was planned
to be held in May, however, it was postponed until October because of concerns
regarding China, North Korea, and South Korea.237

The deployment of the Japan

Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in the exercise was criticized by these
countries because of Japan’s historical imperialism.

As a result, the Japan Coast

Guard (JCG), as a law enforcement agency, stopped and searched a suspicious vessel
while guarded by the JMSDF during the scenario.238

In 2007, Japan also hosted

another exercise, “PACIFIC SHIELD 07” where 40 countries, including observers,
attended.239
and
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Japan has also conducted outreach activities so that the level of
understanding of Asian countries concerning PSI would rise.

Japan has been

hosting “Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP)” since 2003 to
strengthen efforts for the non-proliferation of WMD and related materials and
increase the awareness of non-proliferation in Asia, where the role of PSI activities is
also discussed.240

All the members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) and several other countries which share common interests in the security
of Asia have been attending the ASTOP.

The United States and South Korea have

been attending the ASTOP since 2003 and China joined since the 2nd meeting held
in 2005.241

5.2. China
China’s geographical features have their important meaning to the PSI
activities where a land border is shared with North Korea and the air routes between
North Korea and its WMD trading partners in South Asia and the Middle East pass
through Chinese airspace.242

Thus, China’s participation in the PSI is desirable for

other PSI participants to strengthen its effectiveness.

However, China reserves its

position and concerns about the legality and the possible consequences of the
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interdiction operations.243

At a Press Conference on December 4, 2003, the Chinese

Foreign Ministry spokesperson commented on China’s position towards the PSI;

the Chinese side understands the concerns of the PSI participating
countries about the proliferation of WMD and their vehicles of delivery.
However the international community also has some concerns about the
legitimacy, effectiveness and possible consequences of the interception
measures of PSI.

The PSI participating countries should give it a

serious consideration.

China has always maintains that the

proliferation issue should be handled through diplomatic and political
methods within the framework of international laws, and all
anti-proliferation measures should contribute to the international and
regional peace, security and stability.244

Moreover, at the Press Conference on February 17, 2004, when Bolton,
then-U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,

243
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visited Chinese officials, China reiterated the above comment.245

Nevertheless,

Bolton appreciated China’s understanding of the concern of PSI participating states
with respect to WMD proliferation and emphasized that “[b]oth China and the United
States obviously are firmly opposed to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and their means of delivery.”246

At the meeting, China and the United

States agreed to enhance cooperation regarding information exchange and to
continue a dialogue on PSI issues.247 However, it is still doubtful whether China will
willingly exchange information, considering the relationship with North Korea.

5.3. Russia
Initially, Russia stayed out of the PSI, considering its legality under
international law, even though the United States had tried to persuade them, and was
the only member of the Group of Eight (G-8) not to join.248

However, on May 31,

2004, while the first anniversary meeting of the PSI was being held in Krakow,
Poland, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation issued a press
release in Moscow, stating that “[t]he threats of WMD proliferation bear a global
character and, accordingly, demand a global response.

We are convinced that only

by collective efforts is it possible to cope with them….The principles for the
Proliferation Security Initiative … correspond to our line in the field of
245
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nonproliferation.” 249

The announcement was greatly welcomed by the United

States and other PSI participants.

Bolton welcomed Russia’s participation by

noting “[w]e expect that our intelligence-sharing and law enforcement and military
assets working with the Russian Federation will make a major contribution to our
effort to interdict WMD trafficking worldwide.”250

He also stated that “Russia is a

great naval power and it has extensive land and air space that can be used for
commercial activities, which we hope and expect will now be closed to
proliferators.”251
However, it seems Russia is still concerned about the PSI’s legality under
international law and a press release noted that Russia will contribute to the PSI,
“with consideration for the compatibility of the actions with the rules of international
law, for their conformance to national legislation and for the commonality of
nonproliferation interests with the partners.”252

It is not clear whether Russia will

actually support PSI operations when “states of proliferation of concern” commit
their proliferation activities.

5.4. South Korea
Given its delicate position, South Korea has remained outside the PSI. Its
stance towards the PSI reflects its foreign policy, the “Sunshine Policy,” that has

249

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press release: On Russia’s
Participation in Proliferation in Security Initiative (PSI).
http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/062c2f5f5fa065d4c3256def0051fa1e/2e1470910be746b6c3256ea600
359aef?OpenDocument.
250
Bolton, note 61 above.
251
Ibid.
252
See note 249 above.

81

attempted to ease tensions and achieve peaceful cooperation with North Korea,
initiated by former President Kim Dae-Jung and succeeded by former President Roh
Moo-hyun, until the current President Lee Myung-bak has taken a more aggressive
stance towards North Korea.

On December 29, 2005, the South Korea National

Security Council, reportedly decided to allow its officials to attend the PSI exercises
as observers.253

South Korea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Pan Ki-mun,

stated that the South Korean government’s position was to “cooperate on a
case-by-case basis.”254

North Korea promptly reacted to South Korean’s decision

and a spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland
denounced that the decision is “unforgivable anti-national crime against fellow
countrymen.” 255

Moreover, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the

state-run agency of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and
speaking for the Workers' Party of Korea and the government, wrote that South
Korea’s attendance at the PSI is “a dangerous action of bedeviling the favorably
developing inter-Korean relations and bringing nuclear holocaust to the Korean
Peninsula” and it urged South Korea to withdraw its decision, otherwise it will be
“accountable for all the consequences to be entailed.”256
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Although South Korea may not participate in the PSI activities, remaining as
an observer, at least it is likely to cooperate on non-operational issues, such as
information sharing, considering its close military relationship with the United
States.

5.5. North Korea
PSI activities are not directed at any single country, however, instead, at
would-be proliferators to hamper the worldwide trafficking of WMD, delivery
systems, and related materials.

Nevertheless, it is also commonly acknowledged

that North Korea is being targeted by the fact that the PSI was evolved from the So
San incident where a North Korean vessel was stopped by the Spanish Navy and
searched by Spanish and American officials while it was transporting scud missiles
from North Korea to Yemen.

Moreover, at the second PSI meeting held in Brisbane,

Australia, in July 2003, the Chairman’s Statement noted that “states and non-state
actors of proliferation concern” referred to North Korea and Iran.257

Further, Bolton

noted that “[w]ithout doubt, North Korea remains the world’s foremost proliferator
of ballistic missiles and related technology to rogue states and hostile regimes.”258
In response to the PSI, North Korea has been denouncing the initiative. At
the time when the first PSI exercise, “PACIFIC PROTECTOR” was conducted in
September 2003, North Korea condemned PSI activities stating that it is “a wanton
violation of the sovereignty of the DPRK and intolerable military provocations as it
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See section 2.3.1 for discussion about “States

was a prelude to a nuclear war.”259

It also noted that the PSI would lead “the

DPRK-U.S. relations to an explosive phase.” 260

Moreover, when Japan was

planning to host the PSI exercise in May 2004 and invited ASEAN members to
observe it, North Korea judged that “its sovereignty is infringed upon even a bit
owing to the vicious blockade of Japanese reactionaries its army and the people will
counter it with a strong retaliation.”261

Considering its impact on neighbouring

countries, Japan postponed the exercise until October later that year.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD
6.1. Conclusion
Proliferation of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials to and from
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern certainly poses great threats to the
world.

Thus, preventing the flow of WMD has been continuing efforts for the

global community to maintain international peace and security.

It is especially true

for the United States where big scale terrorist attacks were brought about as realities
on September 11, 2001.

It has also been a top priority agenda among the states in

East Asia where one of the “proliferation concern states” is located.
In the meanwhile, the So San incident clearly demonstrated that existing
regimes did not have enough capabilities to hamper the proliferation of WMD and
related materials.

The PSI, announced in May 2003, in Krakow, Poland, with the

commitments of 11 countries, was the answer that the United States and like-minded
countries had sought in order to break through the situation.

The PSI is a

multilateral effort that aims to interdicting the shipments of WMD and related
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

The PSI

activities involve, inter alia, information sharing and interdiction exercises among
the participants.

More than 30 interdiction exercises have been conducted since

2003 to promote international cooperation and capacity building to prevent
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trafficking of WMD and related materials (See Appendix C).262

The exercises also

contain clear and strong message to proliferators that PSI members are committed to
making cooperative effort to prevent proliferation of WMD.263
The PSI is said to be an “activity” rather than an organization.

It has no

headquarters, secretariat, and budget. The cooperation that will be expected for the
activities is on an ad hoc basis. This flexibility is considered to be one of the
reasons that understanding of the initiative widely spread since its interception. On
May 28, 2008, representatives of more than 80 countries, including non-participating
states to the initiative such as China, India, and Pakistan, gathered in the PSI fifth
anniversary senior-level meeting, held in Washington D.C., the United States.264
The number of the participants to the initiative has increased since its interception
and as of May 28, 2008, 91 countries have participated in the initiative (See
Appendix B).265
This dissertation has attempted to provide a critical review of the PSI and
addressed its incompatibilities with UNCLOS.

For example, under UNCLOS

vessels of all states are given the “right of innocent passage” in the territorial sea and
the coastal state cannot infringe the innocent passage unless the passage is prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal states.
262

Transportation of WMD

U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, "United States to Host Fifth Anniversary
Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting; National Security Advisor Steve Hadley to
Providekeynote Address," May 22, 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/200/may/105147.htm.
263
Ibid.
264
U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, "Washington Declaration for PSI 5th
Anniversary
Senior-Level
Meeting,"
May
28,
2008,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/105268.htm.; See also Wade Boese, "Interdiction
Initiative Successes Assessed," Arms Control Today
(July/August 2008).
http://www.armscontrol.org/.
265
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, note 57 above.
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and related materials, however, does not constitute criteria that are prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the costal states under Article 19(2). Moreover, on
the high seas, vessels are given the “freedom of navigation.”

States may conduct a

“right of visit” to a vessel if the vessel is reasonably suspected engaging in the
activities provided under Article 110.

However, again, the conditions given in it do

not include transportation of WMD and related materials. Further, flag states are
guaranteed its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, thus, PSI participants are not
allowed to take measures against a vessel without consent of the flag state on the
high sea.

These PSI’s incompatibilities with UNCLOS made several countries,

such as China, remain outside the initiative.

In order to overcome these dilemmas,

the United States has been concluding boarding agreements with the major flags of
registry countries.
This dissertation has also conducted a review of two 2005 SUA Protocols in
relation to the PSI. It has demonstrated the 2005 SUA Protocols will strengthen the
worldwide trend of counter-terrorism and it will also greatly enhance the PSI’s
legitimacy.

As examined in this research, newly developed Protocols have

criminalized transportation of WMD and related materials under Article 3bis(b)
although there is a condition that the person should “unlawfully and intentionally”
commit the offence under the Article.

Moreover, under Article 8bis, states are given

strong legal basis to stop, search, and seize WMD and related materials on board a
foreign flagged vessel on the high seas if the flag state authorizes them to do so.
Upon entering into force, the PSI participants will finally acquire their legal
foundation for the interdiction operations.

87

Nevertheless, it seems to take years for

its entry into force.

As of June 6, 2008, six states have signed the 2005 Protocol to

the SUA Convention, however, none of them are operative.

The slow ratification

pace of the 2005 SUA Protocols is another reason why the United States has been
consistently proceeding the boarding agreements with the major flags of registry
countries. Boarding agreements likely allow more dynamic PSI operations beyond
the 2005 SUA Protocols.
Moreover, responses towards the PSI in the East Asian region are carefully
reviewed in this dissertation.

It has demonstrated that, given its delicate situation in

the region, not all the countries are willing to participate in the initiative, although
they share the same concern towards the proliferation of WMD and related materials.
While Russia finally agreed to join the initiative, it still holds its concern about the
legality of the initiative.

China and South Korea remain outside of the initiative

although they seem to join intelligence sharing for non-proliferation of WMD in
general.

China has also been expressing its concern about the legitimacy of the

initiative. It seems only Japan has been actively engaging in the initiative as can be
seen in their outreach activities such as ASTOP that aims to strengthen efforts and
increase awareness towards non-proliferation of WMD and related materials in
Asia-Pacific region.

On the contrary, North Korea has been strongly against the

initiative since its interception. It is noted that the PSI would lead the U.S.-North
Korea relations to an “explosive phase.”
It is hoped that the examination conducted herein will be useful for
understanding the initiative; controversial legal issue under UNCLOS; implication of
the 2005 SUA Protocols in the PSI perspective; and the reaction of the East Asian

88

countries towards the initiative.

It is further hoped that this dissertation would help

administrators or policy-makers making a non-proliferation policy. It is recognized
that the current structure of the PSI entails several shortcomings and, thus, it is
difficult to acquire global support. Without global understandings, the effectiveness
of the initiative would certainly be limited. However, this does not mean that the
idea of the PSI is wrong. On the contrary, such kind of non-proliferation regime is
under a growing demand in the worldwide trend of counter-terrorism to maintain
international peace and security.

The PSI still has its potential to be accepted if the

participants make necessary modifications to it.
To end this dissertation, the following suggestions are presented, hoping the
PSI to be a full-fledged regime so that it will be able to contribute toward
international peace and security.

6.2. The way forward
6.2.1. Establishing a formal organization
As stated above, the notion of the PSI is maintained by its characteristic as
an “activity” rather than an organization.

As such, if interdiction operation is

considered, supporters of the PSI will be able to engage in it depending on their own
“willingness” and take preferable measures according to their political situation at
that time.

This flexibility can be considered as an advantage of the PSI and it will

allow involving states speedy decision making and shifting to interdiction operations
promptly.

Moreover, this flexibility is considered to be one of the reasons that led
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Russia to participate in the PSI although their commitment is still doubtful.266

It has

finally got understandings from China and South Korea although they are not
considered as participants in the initiative, and they are also expected to be involved
with respect to information sharing. Considering the delicate situation in East Asia,
the flexibility of the PSI seems to fit into the region.
However, as has been noted above, it is doubtful whether concerned
countries will be willing to exchange information under its informal structure.

This

concern may undermine the basis of the PSI activities where it aims to hamper illicit
trafficking of WMD based on intelligence from its supporters.

Moreover, the lack

of formal organization would increase the risks of conflict in interdiction operation
and raise unnecessary questions. 267

What constitutes “states of proliferation

concern”? What kind of related materials would cause threats, especially if they are
dual-use? How and who would command the case, bearing such uncertainties?
Further, as long as it does not have a formal body and budget, its status will always
remain vulnerable as governments’ policy changes, the governments’ priority for
non-proliferation and their view for the PSI would change.268
In order to overcome such concerns, the PSI must be established under a
formal mechanism where a budget is provided and regular intelligence sharing
among all participants would be conducted. This will strengthen the validity of the
intelligence and enhance the sustainability of the PSI. Valencia notes that it should be
brought into the UN auspices as it is advocated in an Act that was approved in House
266

Prosser and Scoville, note 157 above.
Garvey, note 88 above, at 137.
268
See Richard Bond, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: Three Years On," BASIC NOTES
(2006). http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060802.pdf.
267
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of Representatives in the United States. 269

However, as Joseph notes, Missile

Technology Control Regime (MTCR) would be a reasonable model for the PSI,
where the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries out point-of-contact functions,
including distribution of working papers to members and hosting of monthly experts
meetings. 270

Unlike putting it under UN system, it will be able to keep its

“flexibility” and provide better communication channel among participants.

By

formalizing the initiative and following to the MTCR as its model, the PSI would
increase its credibility and sustainability as a non-proliferation regime.

6.2.2. Strengthening the legality of the PSI operation
Both Russia’s initial hesitation to join the initiative and China’s current
status to remain outside of the PSI is due to the lack of its operational legality. As
previously discussed, the new 2005 SUA Protocols will provide strong legal basis for
interdiction operation. The Protocols criminalize transportation of WMD and the
related materials; moreover, states are given legal basis to stop, search, and seize the
illicit cargos on board a foreign flagged vessel on the high seas if the flag state
authorizes them to do so. Accordingly, states are strongly encouraged to sign and
269

Valencia, note 1 above, at 74, and note 159 above. See also Valencia, "Put the PSI under the
UN," Global Asia 3, no. 2 (2008), 46. http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue6/v3n2_valencia.pdf. The
Act notes that the President should strive to expand and strengthen the PSI by “[w]orking with
the United Nations Security Council to develop a resolution to authorize the PSI under
international law.” It also requires the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to submit
a defined budget for the PSI. See “Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act
of 2007,” Section 1221, “Proliferation Security Initiative Improvements and Authorities,” 1st
Session, 100th Congress.
270
Joseph, note 46 above.; Gahlaut also notes that the PSI shares common characteristics with
other multilateral export control regimes – the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG). See Seema Gahlaut, "The
PSI Will Parallel the Multilateral Export Control Regimes," The Monitor 10, no. 1 (2004).
http://www.uga.edu/cits/..
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ratify the two SUA Protocols to enhance its effectiveness. However, it may not be a
short-term solution, considering its pessimistic views for entering into force as
previously discussed. That is why the United States has been signing bilateral
agreements with major flag of registry countries, so that they can interdict WMD and
the related materials legitimately under the consent of flag state.
does receive criticisms.

Nevertheless, it

As the number of participants grows, “they may be able to

bend international law, but they cannot rewrite it.” 271

However, bending

international law will lead other states to justify their aggressive action.272
The issue of legality is a root obstacle that has to be overcome.

To solve

this problem, the PSI participants should consider introducing a UN Security Council
resolution that will authorize the interdiction of suspected WMD in international
waters.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 has been introduced to request

all states “to take cooperative action” to prevent illicit trafficking in WMD and the
related materials.

However, it does not provide any new legal authority to carry out

interdiction operation. The PSI supporters need to develop a UN Security Council
resolution that will go beyond the Resolution 1540 and will authorize interdiction of
WMD and the related materials.273

Under Article 42 of Chapter VII of Charter of

the United Nations, Security Council may “take such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or resort international peace and security.”274
271

Friedman, note 3 above, at 8.
Ibid.
273
Michael Becker, "The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the
Interdiction of Ships at Sea," Harvard International Law Journal 46, no. 1 (2005), 219.
http://dialnet.unirioja.es/. On the contrary, Lehrman suggests that PSI participants sign ship
boarding agreements to ensure the resolution’s enforcement. See Lehrman, note 157 above, at
24.
274
Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
272
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Clear authorization of interdiction operation under the resolution, including use of
armed force, would strongly enhance the PSI activities.275

The European Union

(EU) is also considering interdiction operation that includes use of force.

Paragraph

4 of the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction states, “When these measures (including political dialogue and
diplomatic pressure) have failed, coercive measures under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter and international law (sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of
shipments and, as appropriate, the use of force) could be envisioned.”276

6.2.3. Expanding the outreach activities
The PSI needs to strengthen its outreach efforts to gain global supports so
that its effectiveness would be enhanced. The participants at the PSI meeting held
in Lisbon, Portugal, in 2004 also agreed that “it was essential to continue broadening
the international consensus” which would be carried out by building on outreach
activities.277

China is a key country in East Asia, considering its geographical

location and relationship with North Korea, to hamper the illicit proliferation of
WMD, delivery system, and the related materials.

Thus, every effort to gain

China’s participation should be continued.

Breaches
of
the
Peace,
and
Acts
of
Aggression,
Article
41.
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm.
275
See Joyner for the argument surrounding the issue of getting authority for the PSI operation
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Daniel H. Joyner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative:
Nonproliferation, Counterproliferation, and International Law," The Yale Jounal of International
Law 30 (2005), 18.
276
European Union, Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, paragraph 4.
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/76328.pdf.
277
Bureau of Nonproliferation, note 58 above.
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Moreover, it is evidenced that North Korea has been exchanging technology
and resources with countries in South Asia and the Middle East, 278 where
transportation between these regions is most likely conducted through the Malacca
Straits.

Accordingly, cooperation among South East Asian countries is also

essential to improve interdiction capability. Singapore has participated in various
PSI exercises since December 2003 and officially joined the PSI since March
2004.279

It has also hosted PSI exercise “DEEP SABRE” in August 2005. On the

contrary, Indonesia and Malaysia are not joining the initiative.

Nevertheless, both

of them are members of the ASEAN280 and participating ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) 281 where WMD proliferation is always one of the top regional security
agenda.

For example, the Chairman’s Statement of the thirteenth ARF, which was

held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in July 2006, noted that “[t]he Ministers stated that
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems,
including potentially to terrorists, remained a serious security challenge” and the
Ministers expressed their support for the implementation of the UN Security Council
Resolution 1540. Although Indonesia and Malaysia are not joining the initiative,
they share the concern for proliferation of WMD.
278

Sharon A. Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade between North Korea and
Pakistan,"
CRS
Report
for
Congress
(2004).
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/30781.pdf
279
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, "Remarks by Chan Heng Chee, Ambassador of
Singapore, at the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Second Anniversary Event Department of
State, May 31, 2005," http://app.mfa.gov.sg/home/index.asp.
280
Members of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See ASEAN website:
http://www.aseansec.org.
281
Current participants in the ARF is 10 ASEAN states plus Australia, Bangladesh, Canada,
China, European Union, India, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea,
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Timor Leste, and the
United States. See ARF website: http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/.
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When expanding the PSI outreach, Japan has been playing an important role
not only in East Asia but also whole Asian region.

As previously touched upon,

Japan has been hosting ASTOP since 2003 to strengthen efforts for the
non-proliferation in Asia where issues of the PSI are also discussed. Moreover, it
has been emphasizing cooperation in non-proliferation of WMD among states at
Japan-ASEAN summit. 282

By enhancing the cooperation among states and

expanding the outreach activity to acquire global supports, the effectiveness of the
initiative will increase which will lead to achieving international peace and security.

282

See, for example, “Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN
Partnership in the New Millennium,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A

The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of
Interdiction Principles (SOP)
(Adopted in Paris, September 4, 2003)

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery
systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the
international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing
treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN
Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the
proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and
underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is
also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union,
establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the
proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants
are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall
into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of
these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI
seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and
the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the
air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags,
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ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive
efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation
norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the
international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on
measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the
following set of "Interdiction Principles."

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a
more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of
WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and
non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities
and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council.
They call on all states concerned with this threat to, international peace and security
to join in similarly committing to:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States
or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries
or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to
interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1)
efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and
associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or
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facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information
concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character
of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative,
dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and
capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction
efforts.
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where
necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when
necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to
support these commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national
legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international
law and frameworks, to include:
a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from
states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any
persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another
state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their
internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial sea of any
other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or
from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such
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cargoes that are identified.
c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances
to the boarding an searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to
the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be
identified by such states.
d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters,
territorial seas, of contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state
actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified;
and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports,
internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying
such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding,
search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e) At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another
state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that
are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes
that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying
such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f) If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points
for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes
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that are identified.

Source: The White House. “Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of
Interdiction
Principles.”
September
4,
2003.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/23764.htm.
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Appendix B

The List of Proliferation Security Initiative
Participants

Afghanistan

Djibouti

Liberia

Romania

Albania

El Salvador

Libya

Russia

Andorra

Estonia

Liechtenstein

Samoa

Angola

Fiji

Lithuania

Saudi Arabia

Argentina

Finland

Luxembourg

Serbia

Armenia

France

Macedonia

Singapore

Australia

Georgia

Malta

Slovakia

Austria

Germany

Marshall Islands

Slovenia

Azerbaijan

Greece

Moldova

Spain

Bahrain

Holy See

Mongolia

Sri Lanka

Belarus

Honduras

Montenegro

Sweden

Belgium

Hungary

Morocco

Switzerland

Belize

Iceland

The Netherlands

Tajikistan

Bosnia

Iraq

New Zealand

Tunisia

Brunei Darussalam Ireland

Norway

Turkey

Bulgaria

Israel

Oman

Turkmenistan

Cambodia

Italy

Panama

Ukraine

Canada

Japan

Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates

Chile

Jordan

Paraguay

United Kingdom

Croatia

Kazakhstan

Philippines

United States

Cyprus

Kyrgyzstan

Poland

Uzbekistan

Czech Republic

Kuwait

Portugal

Yemen

Denmark

Latvia

Qatar
Current as of May 22, 2008

Source: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of
State. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm
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Appendix C

Proliferation Security Initiative Meetings and
Exercises

1. PSI Meetings and Exercises in 2008 and Upcoming Events
PSI Meetings and Exercises in 2008 and Upcoming Events
Date
2008 Feb 4-6

Place
Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting, London, UK

Mar. 10-12 Exercise Guistir 08: Djibouti and France-hosted maritime / port
interdiction exercise. Key participants: Red Sea and Maghreb
countries
Apr. 8-22

Exercise Phoenix Express 08: U.S. led maritime interoperability
exercise in the Mediterranean Sea. Maritime interdiction PSI
scenario injects included

May 12-14 Exercise Adriatic Shield 08: Croatia hosted maritime / port
interdiction exercise. Key participants: Adriatic Sea countries,
Poland, and the U.S.
May 28-29 5th Year PSI Anniversary Conference, Washington, DC
Aug. 11-22 Exercise PANAMAX 08: US hosted. Maritime PSI Scenario
Inject
Sept. 15-19 Exercise MARU 07: Auckland, New Zealand hosted PSI exercise
Sept. 24-26 Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting, Paris, France
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2009

Exercise Trade Winds: US SOUTHCOM US/Caribbean Sea
LIVEX with maritime interdiction PSI scenario injects
Exercise Phoenix Express US EUCOM led maritime
interoperability exercise in the Mediterranean Sea with maritime
interdiction PSI scenario injects
Exercise Trade Winds: US SOUTHCOM US/Caribbean Sea
LIVEX with PSI scenario injects
Singapore-led PSI exercise in Asia-Pacific
Exercise LEADING EDGE: U.S. hosted exercise (Persian Gulf)

2. PSI Operational Experts Meetings (2003-2007)
PSI Operational Experts Meetings (2003-2007)
No. of
Date

Place

meetings
per year

2003 July 9-10

Operational Experts Meeting, Brisbane,
Australia

July 30

Operational Experts Meeting, London, United
Kingdom

Sept. 3-4

Operational Experts Meeting, Paris, France

Oct. 8-10

Operational Experts Meeting, London, United
Kingdom
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5

Dec. 16-17

Operational Experts Meeting, Washington, DC,
United States

2004 Apr. 16-17
Aug. 3-4

Operational Experts Meeting, Ottawa, Canada

4

Shipping Container Security Workshop,
Copenhagen, Denmark

Aug. 5-6

Operational Experts Meeting, Oslo, Norway

Nov. 30-

Operational Experts Meeting, Sydney, Australia

Dec. 2
2005 Mar. 21-22

Operational Experts Meeting, Omaha,

4

Nebraska, United States
July 6-7

Operational Experts Meeting, Copenhagen,
Denmark

Sept. 14-15

Air Cargo Industry Workshop, Los Angeles,
California, United States

Nov. 24-26

Regional Operational Experts Group Meeting,
Hamburg, Germany

2006 Apr. 11-12

Operational Experts Meeting, Miami, Florida,

4

United States
July 25-26

Operational Experts Meeting, Singapore

Sept. 25-26

Maritime Industry Workshop, London, U.K.

Dec. 5-7

Operational Experts Meeting, Montreal, Canada

2007 Jan.
31-Feb .1

Proliferation Finance Workshop, Washington,
DC, United States
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Mar. 26-28

Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting,
Auckland, New Zealand

Oct. 2-4

Operational Experts Group (OEG) Meeting,
Rhodes, Greece

3. PSI Exercises (2003-2007)
PSI Exercises (2003-2007)
No. of
Date

Place

exercises
per year

2003 Sept. 10-13

Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR: Australia-led

4

maritime exercise conducted in the Coral Sea
Oct. 8-10

Air CPX: United Kingdom-led air interception
command post (tabletop) exercise conducted in
London, United Kingdom

Oct. 13-17

Exercise SANSO '03: Spain-led maritime exercise
conducted in the Western Mediterranean

Nov. 25-27

Exercise BASILIC '03: France-led maritime
exercise conducted in the Western Mediterranean

2004 Jan. 11-17

Exercise SEA SABER: United States-led maritime
exercise conducted in the Arabian Sea, United
States
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Feb. 19

Exercise AIR BRAKE '03: Italian-led air
interception exercise conducted over Italy (Trapani)

Mar. 31-Apr. 1 Exercise HAWKEYE: Germany-led customs
exercise conducted in Germany (Frankfurt Airport)
Apr. 19-22

Exercise CLEVER SENTINEL: Italy-led maritime
exercise conducted in the Mediterranean

Apr. 19-21

Exercise SAFE BORDERS: Poland-led ground
interdiction exercise conducted in Poland (vicinity
Wroclaw)

June 23-24

Exercise APSE '04: France-led simulated air
interception exercise

Sept.27-Oct. 1 PSI Gaming Exercise: United States-hosted exercise
at Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island
Oct. 25-27

Exercise TEAM SAMURAI '04: Japan-led maritime
interdiction exercise

Nov. 8-18

Exercise CHOKEPOINT '04: United States-led
maritime interdiction exercise

2005 Apr. 8-15

Exercise NINFA '05: Portugal-led maritime/ground
interdiction exercise

June 1-2

Exercise BOHEMIAN GUARD '05: Czech
Republic- and Poland-led regional ground
interdiction exercise
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6

June 7-8

Exercise BLUE ACTION '05: Spain-led air/ground
interdiction exercise

Aug. 15-19

Exercise DEEP SABRE: Singapore-led
maritime/ground interdiction exercise

Oct. 3-7

PSI Air Gaming Exercise: Norwegian-hosted
exercise at Norwegian Naval Academy, Bergen,
Norway

Nov. 14-19

Exercise EXPLORING THEMIS: United
Kingdom-hosted maritime/CPX interdiction
exercise

2006 Apr. 4-5

Exercise TOP PORT: Netherlands-hosted maritime /
CPX interdiction exercise

Apr. 4-6

Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR '06:
Australia-hosted Air / CPX interdiction exercise

May 24-26

Exercise ANATOLIAN SUN: Turkey-hosted
combined air, land and sea CPX and LIVEX
interdiction exercise

June 21-22

Exercise HADES '06: French-hosted air interdiction
exercise

Sept. 13-15

Exercise AMBER SUNRISE: Poland-hosted with
Denmark, Russia and Sweden maritime/ground
exercise
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Oct. 10-31

Exercise LEADING EDGE: U.S. hosted CPX and
maritime/ground interdiction exercise (Persian
Gulf)

2007 Apr. 26-27

Exercise SMART RAVEN: Lithuania hosted air

6

interdiction exercise (Key participants: Estonia,
Latvia and Poland)
May 27-29

Exercise ADRIATIC GATE: Slovenia hosted
ground/port interdiction exercise

June 18-22

PSI Gaming Exercise: United States-hosted exercise
at Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

Aug.29-Sept.7 Exercise PANAMAX 07: US hosted. Maritime PSI
Scenario Inject
Oct. 12-15

Exercise Pacific Shield 07: Japan hosted PSI
maritime/port interdiction exercise

Oct. 29-31

Exercise Eastern Shield 07: Ukraine hosted
combined air, ground, and sea interdiction exercise
(Key participants: Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia,
Moldova and Poland

Source: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of
State. “Calendar of Events.” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c12684.htm.
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Appendix D

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005
(2005 SUA Convention) (extract)

(Consolidated text of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation and of the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention)

Article 1
.…
(d)

BCN weapon means:

(i) “biological weapons”, which are:
(1) microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; or
(2) weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
(ii) “chemical weapons”, which are, together or separately:
(1) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for:
(A) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other
peaceful purposes; or
(B) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to
protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against
chemical weapons; or
(C) military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons
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and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals
as a method of warfare; or
(D) law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes,
as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(2) munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or other
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in
subparagraph (ii)(1), which would be released as a result of the
employment of such munitions and devices;
(3) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with
the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph
(ii)(2).
(iii)

“nuclear weapons” and other “nuclear explosive devices”.

….
Article 2
1 This Convention does not apply to:
(a)

a warship; or

(b)

a ship owned or operated by a State when being used as a naval auxiliary or
for customs or police purposes; or

(c)

a ship which has been withdrawn from navigation or laid up.

2 Nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other
Government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.

Article 2bis

127

….
3 Nothing in this Convention shall affect the rights, obligations and responsibilities
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Washington, London and Moscow on 1 July 1968, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington,
London and Moscow on 10 April 1972, or the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction, done at Paris on 13 January 1993, of States Parties to such
treaties.
….
Article 3bis
1 Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person unlawfully and intentionally:
(a)

when the purpose of the act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act:
(i) uses against or on a ship or discharges from a ship any explosive,
radioactive material or BCN weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to
cause death or serious injury or damage; or
(ii) discharges, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or
noxious substance, which is not covered by subparagraph (a)(i), in such
quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious
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injury or damage; or
(iii) uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage; or
(iv) threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for under national
law, to commit an offence set forth in subparagraph (a)(i), (ii) or (iii); or
(b) transports on board a ship:
(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to be
used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without a condition, as is
provided for under national law, death or serious injury or damage for the
purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act; or
(ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as defined in article 1;
or
(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or material
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of
special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a
nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under
safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement; or
(iv) any equipment, materials or software or related technology that
significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN
weapon, with the intention that it will be used for such purpose.
2 It shall not be an offence within the meaning of this Convention to transport an
item or material covered by paragraph 1(b)(iii) or, insofar as it relates to a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device, paragraph 1(b)(iv), if such item or
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material is transported to or from the territory of, or is otherwise transported under
the control of, a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons where:
(a)

the resulting transfer or receipt, including internal to a State, of the item or
material is not contrary to such State Party's obligations under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and,

(b)

if the item or material is intended for the delivery system of a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a State Party to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the holding of such weapon or
device is not contrary to that State Party’s obligations under that Treaty.

Article 3ter
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person
unlawfully and intentionally transports another person on board a ship knowing that
the person has committed an act that constitutes an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis
or 3quater or an offence set forth in any treaty listed in the Annex, and intending to
assist that person to evade criminal prosecution.

Article 3quater
Any person also commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person:
(a)

unlawfully and intentionally injures or kills any person in connection with
the commission of any of the offences set forth in article 3, paragraph 1,
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article 3bis, or article 3ter; or
(b)

attempts to commit an offence set forth in article 3, paragraph 1, article 3bis,
paragraph 1(a)(i), (ii) or (iii) , or subparagraph (a) of this article; or

(c)

participates as an accomplice in an offence set forth in article 3, article 3bis,
article 3ter, or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article; or

(d)

organizes or directs others to commit an offence set forth in article 3, article
3bis, article 3ter, or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article; or

(e)

contributes to the commission of one or more offences set forth in article 3,
article 3bis, article 3ter or subparagraph (a) or (b) of this article, by a group
of persons acting with a common purpose, intentionally and either:
(i) with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an
offence set forth in article 3, 3bis or 3ter; or
(ii) in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit an offence set
forth in article 3, 3bis or 3ter.

….
Article 5
Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quater
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those
offences.

Article 5bis
1 Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, shall take the
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necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized
under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for management or
control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in
this Convention. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative.
2 Such liability is incurred without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals
having committed the offences.
3 Each State Party shall ensure, in particular, that legal entities liable in accordance
with paragraph 1 are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal,
civil or administrative sanctions. Such sanctions may include monetary sanctions.
….
Article 8
1 The master of a ship of a State Party (the “flag State”) may deliver to the
authorities of any other State Party (the “receiving State”) any person who the master
has reasonable grounds to believe has committed an offence set forth in article 3,
3bis, 3ter, or 3quater.
….
Article 8bis
1 States Parties shall co-operate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress
unlawful acts covered by this Convention, in conformity with international law,
and shall respond to requests pursuant to this article as expeditiously as possible.
….
4 A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence set forth in
article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be committed

132

involving a ship flying its flag, may request the assistance of other States Parties in
preventing or suppressing that offence. The States Parties so requested shall use
their best endeavours to render such assistance within the means available to them.
5 Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a State Party (“the
requesting Party”) encounter a ship flying the flag or displaying marks of registry
of another State Party (“the first Party”) located seaward of any State’s territorial
sea, and the requesting Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a
person on board the ship has been, is or is about to be involved in the commission
of an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater, and the requesting Party
desires to board,
(a) it shall request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 that the first Party
confirm the claim of nationality, and
(b) if nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party shall ask the first Party
(hereinafter referred to as “the flag State”) for authorization to board and to
take appropriate measures with regard to that ship which may include
stopping, boarding and searching the ship, its cargo and persons on board,
and questioning the persons on board in order to determine if an offence set
forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be
committed, and
(c) the flag State shall either:
(i)

authorize the requesting Party to board and to take appropriate measures
set out in subparagraph (b), subject to any conditions it may impose in
accordance with paragraph 7; or
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(ii)

conduct the boarding and search with its own law enforcement or other
officials; or

(iii)

conduct the boarding and search together with the requesting Party,
subject to any conditions it may impose in accordance with paragraph 7;
or

(iv)

decline to authorize a boarding and search.

The requesting Party shall not board the ship or take measures set out in
subparagraph (b) without the express authorization of the flag State.
(d) Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General that, with respect to
ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry, the requesting Party is
granted authorization to board and search the ship, its cargo and persons on
board, and to question the persons on board in order to locate and examine
documentation of its nationality and determine if an offence set forth in
article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be committed,
if there is no response from the first Party within our hours of
acknowledgement of receipt of a request to confirm nationality.
(e) Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General that, with respect to
ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry, the requesting Party is
authorized to board and search a ship, its cargo and persons on board, and to
question the persons on board in order to determine if an offence set forth in
article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has been, is being or is about to be committed.
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The notifications made pursuant to this paragraph can be withdrawn at any time.

6 When evidence of conduct described in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater is found as
the result of any boarding conducted pursuant to this article, the flag State may
authorize the requesting Party to detain the ship, cargo and persons on board
pending receipt of disposition instructions from the flag State. The requesting
Party shall promptly inform the flag State of the results of a boarding, search, and
detention conducted pursuant to this article. The requesting Party shall also
promptly inform the flag State of the discovery of evidence of illegal conduct that
is not subject to this Convention.
7 The flag State, consistent with the other provisions of this Convention, may
subject its authorization under paragraph 5 or 6 to conditions, including obtaining
additional information from the requesting Party, and conditions relating to
responsibility for and the extent of measures to be taken. No additional measures
may be taken without the express authorization of the flag State, except when
necessary to relieve imminent danger to the lives of persons or where those
measures derive from relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements.
8 For all boardings pursuant to this article, the flag State has the right to exercise
jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo or other items and persons on board,
including seizure, forfeiture, arrest and prosecution. However, the flag State may,
subject to its constitution and laws, consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by
another State having jurisdiction under article 6.
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